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THIS paper examines the course of inflation in the United States since the 
turn of the century as a means of throwing light on several major contro- 
versies in current research on inflation. The paper does not attempt to 
build a better econometric model of the inflation process. Rather, it is an 
exercise in analytical history that suggests certain conclusions about wage 
and price behavior at odds with the recent accelerationist variants of infla- 
tion theory. 
The paper is principally concerned with the economy's aggregate sup- 
ply curve. The discussion considers the influence of monetary and other 
elements  of  demand management policy  on  the  shape  of  that  curve 
through their effect on expectations. But it does not deal with the deter- 
minants of aggregate demand nor does it enter the controversy about the 
role of  money  versus other factors  determining demand.  It  takes  the 
course of aggregate demand as given and concentrates upon the response 
of inflation to it. 
Throughout most of the paper the basic unit of observation is a busi- 
ness-cycle expansion or contraction. Units of data are measured not over 
quarterly or annual intervals but are expressed as average levels or rates 
of change during each expansion or contraction. With eighty years of 
business-cycle history and a total of twenty-seven expansions and con- 
tractions-not  counting the wartime cycles-there  are sufficient observa- 
tions to conduct the quantitative analysis in this way. 
I am grateful to Robert J. Gordon, who provided extensive comments, and to 
members  of the Brookings  panel for their help during the preparation  of this paper. 
Research  assistance  was ably provided  by Thomas C. Hier and Stephen L. Garbacz. 
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This approach is a complement to, not a substitute for, the use of an- 
nual and quarterly econometric equations as a device to test hypotheses 
about the behavior of inflation. Grouping the data into cycle expansions 
and contractions has some disadvantages. It is obviously not a good way 
to ferret out lag structures. (As a consequence, on occasion I use monthly 
series to examine cyclical patterns of price acceleration and deceleration.) 
And, because this procedure averages annual data within each cyclical 
phase, it reduces the variance of the data and so loses some information. 
The cyclical approach has some important advantages, however. The 
ratio of measurement noise to true signal is likely to be much smaller 
when comparing variable averages in expansion to those in contraction 
than when comparing one year's data to the next, especially in a study 
that must rely upon data from cycles  as far back as  1900.  Moreover, 
breaking the eighty-year period into a relatively small number of business 
cycles lends itself to an examination of particular questions in ways that 
sometimes give more insight than do regression equations. For example, is 
the rise in employment typically kept going during cycle expansions by 
an acceleration of inflation a la Friedman-Phelps? 
I  begin by  examining the  responsiveness  of  inflation to  changes  in 
aggregate demand in the expansions and contractions of peacetime busi- 
ness cycles from 1900 to the mid-1960s.  Particular emphasis is placed on 
determining whether that response altered between the prewar and post- 
war periods. Differences in behavior between prices and wages are ex- 
amined, as are differences among various measures of prices. I extend the 
analysis to look at the role of the level of demand (Phillips curve)  and 
the historical presence or absence of  accelerationist tendencies  during 
cycle phases over the same period. The behavior of inflation during the 
two wartime cycles  (which turns out to have been quite different from 
behavior at other times)  is then investigated, and the period from 1966 
to the present is separately examined. In each section some implications 
of the findings for the competing theories of the inflationary process are 
suggested, and these are summarized.1 
1. Robert Gordon, in a  series of  recent papers, has  subjected the long-term 
behavior of  inflation to  econometric analysis. Some of  the major conclusions in 
this paper confirm  Gordon's  findings;  for instance,  Gordon notes in his comments  on 
this paper that the rate of change in output, employment, and nominal GNP plays 
a large part in determining  the course of inflation. On the other hand, some of the 
conclusions of this paper differ from those of Gordon, and these are indicated. See 
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This paper was originally conceived as the first step in an analysis of 
a presumed postwar decrease in the cyclical sensitivity of price and wage 
behavior to changes in aggregate demand, a phenomenon apparently well 
documented by Cagan and Sachs.2 The paper begins, therefore, with an 
attempt to measure the cyclical responsiveness of inflation to movements 
in aggregate demand. But the nature of the measurement itself depends 
in part upon the theoretical structure that one believes best describes the 
cyclical inflationary process. One can relate the level, rate of change, or 
acceleration and deceleration of prices to the level,  rate of  change, or 
acceleration and deceleration of aggregate demand variables. The alterna- 
tive sets of relations can roughly be grouped according to doctrinal views 
about the process of inflation. 
While the best part of a library could be stocked with material bearing 
on the subject, the competing approaches to macro inflation theory in the 
past thirty years can be  condensed  into  the  following  four  basic  ap- 
proaches to modeling the inflation process. 
The early Keynesian view and "speed limit" approaches.  The level of 
prices is a function of the level of actual output (or employment) relative 
to potential output  (or  labor force),  subject to  a special constraint of 
wages that are sticky downward. The rate of  change in price depends 
upon the rate of change in employment or output. 
This Keynesian model of the aggregate supply curve is based on the 
presumed need for a rise in prices relative to unchanged wages, as employ- 
ers move  down  their labor  demand curves,  and from  the  increase in 
wages that would begin to occur in the region of full employment. It is 
not necessary to rely upon the dubious assumption that real wages sys- 
tematically move inversely with output, however, to show that the price 
level may move with the level of output. As is discussed below, wage in- 
teen Historical Episodes," Conference Paper 108 (National Bureau of  Economic 
Research, 1981);  "A Consistent Characterization  of  a Near-Century of  Price Be- 
havior,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol.  70  (May  1980,  Papers  and Proceedings, 
1979),  pp. 243-49;  "Price Inertia and Policy Ineffectiveness in the United States 
1890-1980"  (Northwestern University,  Department of  Economics,  September 
1981); and "Output  Fluctuation and Gradual Price Adjustment,"  Journal of Eco- 
nomic  Literature,  vol.  19 (June  1981),  pp. 493-530. 
2.  Phillip Cagan, "Changes  in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices in the 
1920's and Post-World  War II," Explorations  in Economic  Research,  vol.  2  (Winter 
1975), pp. 54-104; Jeffrey Sachs, "The Changing Cyclical Behavior of Wages and 
Prices: 1890-1976," American  Economic Review, vol. 70 (March 1980), pp. 78-90. 524  Brookings  Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
creases may occur in expanding firms as a means of channeling a flow of 
job applicants from the Keynesian unemployed to those firms. The size of 
the increase needed is a function of the magnitude of the expansion. The 
rate of inflation thus depends upon the rate of change in employment and 
output. 
The Phillips curve.  In Arthur Okun's phrase, the Phillips curve slipped 
a derivative on the earlier formulation. The rate of change of prices is 
expressed as a function of the level of unemployment or of the gap be- 
tween actual and potential output. The cost of improving the economy's 
utilization rate is a one-time increase in the rate of inflation. 
The Phelps-Friedman adaptive accelerationist view.  In the next phase 
the derivative slips still another notch. The rate of change of inflation is 
now a function of the gap or the unemployment rate. The equilibrium or 
"natural"  rates of unemployment and output are given by the intersection 
of labor demand and supply curves. Market-clearing forces will move 
wages and prices to establish that equilibrium. The real wage that enters 
the labor supply curve is based, however, on an expected rate of general 
inflation in prices, wages, or both that adapts promptly but not instanta- 
neously to actual inflation experience. As  a consequence, whenever un- 
employment is held below  the natural rate by  expansionary aggregate 
demand policy, inflation continually accelerates because the initially per- 
ceived increase in real wages is always being wiped out by the adaptation 
of expectations (and information) to the experience of inflation and must 
be  continually reestablished with  ever-larger increases in the  nominal 
wage.3 Conversely, so long as unemployment is kept above the natural 
rate, inflation will decelerate. 
Rational expectations.  The rationality of economic agents, whose pur- 
suit of unexploited opportunities for mutual trade provides the market- 
clearing pressure in the accelerationist model, requires that expectations 
of future prices be based not on adaptation to past inflation, but on all 
the information available. Because in a world of rapidly clearing markets 
inflation can be viewed as solely a monetary phenomenon, rational agents 
3. Various versions of an accelerationist  process have been elaborated,  involving 
different ways in which relative prices are based on  expectations or data about 
the rate of  general inflation that adapt with a lag to actual inflation experience; 
see Milton Friedman,  "The Role of Monetary  Policy," American Economic Review, 
vol.  58  (March 1968),  pp. 1-17; Edmund S. Phelps and others, Microeconomic 
Foundations  of  Employment  and  Iniflation  Theory  (W.  Norton  and  Co.,  Inc., 
1970);  and Robert E.  Lucas, Jr., "Expectations and the Neutrality of  Money," 
Joulrnal of Economic  Theory,  vol.  4  (April  1972),  pp.  103-24. Charles L. Schultze  525 
can be modeled as forecasting inflation on the basis of their forecast of 
monetary policy, which in turn is heavily based on the systematic past 
behavior of the monetary authorities. If the coefficients that relate current 
inflation to past inflation rates sum to unity, for example, it is not because 
this is inherent in the nature of expectations-rather  it is the result of past 
experience with inflationary monetary policy.  (Although rational expec- 
tations theorists are monetarist in persuasion, the effect of expected fiscal 
policy  on  inflationary expectations  can  be  included  without  changing 
anything significant for the purposes of this paper.) 
One particular implication of rational expectations theory should be 
noted  at this stage inasmuch as it is especially relevant to  a long-term 
historical analysis of inflation. According to the theory, the response of 
inflation to an expected change in nominal aggregate demand is prompt 
and substantial. But if economic agents, on the basis of past experience, 
expect monetary (and fiscal) policy to be dedicated to the pursuit of em- 
ployment stability, and to turn expansive at the first sign of an economic 
downturn, they will expect any decline in nominal demand to be merely 
a transient one  and prices will  behave  accordingly. According  to  the 
rational expectations theorists, the small response of inflation to changes 
in aggregate demand in mainline models-George  Perry's term embrac- 
ing the broad class of models with structural inflation inertia-is  there- 
fore misleading. The large and prompt potential response of inflation to a 
change in nominal demand, which is a property of the market-clearing 
economic system, has been masked in the aggregate data by the expecta- 
tional consequences of employment-oriented countercyclical policy. Thus 
this theory implies that, in periods when such policies were absent, the 
response of  inflation to  changes in  nominal  aggregate demand should 
have been considerably larger than that predicted by the coefficients on 
unemployment, the change in unemployment, or related variables typi- 
cally estimated in the mainline models. 
The debate among the  competing views  of  the inflationary process 
hinges partly on the role of expectations in the determination of current 
prices and on alternative hypotheses about how expectations are formed. 
The relevant variables are not observable and must be inferred indirectly. 
Actual prices, for example, must be supposed to respond with short or 
long lags to  changes in  demand variables, and weakly  or  strongly to 
changes in expected prices; these in turn respond with greater or lesser 
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tations that may on occasion be in the process of gradually adapting to 
the installation of a new policy regime. 
Seeking to reach conclusions about expectations by observing regres- 
sion coefficients on lagged price or wage variables, by algebraic manipu- 
lation of coefficients on lagged real disequilibrium variables, or by using 
residuals to classify economic policy into its systematic and surprise com- 
ponents is one way to proceed, but it is surely a very chancy business. 
As  Bennett McCallum recently put it in  a nice bit of  understatement, 
"....  it is not a trivial matter to interpret the speed of [inflation] response 
to unobserved variables in a stochastic setting."4  Analysis and historical 
comparison of the cyclical characteristics of inflation ought, therefore, to 
be a useful supplement to the more usual econometric analysis of quar- 
terly or annual data as an additional means of inferring if and how such 
unobserved variables influence inflation. For example, has the sensitivity 
of inflation to cyclical expansions and contractions of demand tended to 
remain unchanged during clearly different monetary policy regimes? Has 
the expansion of employment typically been maintained during cyclical 
expansions at the cost of accelerating inflation? 
The Cyclical Response of Inflation to Changes in Aggregate Demand 
For reasons summarized above and elaborated in the discussion that 
follows, the business cycles of the past eighty years are divided into three 
groups in the present study: peacetime cycles through 1966  (1901-14, 
1924-40,  1950-66);  wartime cycles and postwar adjustments (1916-22, 
1941-49);  and the period since 1966, which includes the last three years 
of the 1961-69  expansion. In addition, results for the peacetime cycles 
are often  shown  in  two  versions:  including  and  excluding  the  Great 
Depression. 
The cyclical  sensitivity of inflation to  changes in aggregate demand 
cannot be measured by partitioning changes in nominal GNP between 
price and quantity changes  and then  comparing prewar with postwar 
cycles.  If  there is  any momentum from past inflation  (or,  in  another 
interpretation, if there is  a relatively persistent inflation norm that in- 
fluences current rates of wage and price increase), partitioning will under- 
estimate the sensitivity of inflation in contractions relative to expansions 
4.  Bennett T. McCallum, "Rational  Expectations and Macroeconomic  Stabiliza- 
tion  Policy:  An  Overview,"  Journal  of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  vol.  12  (No- 
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and in periods in which inherited inflation or inflation norms are large 
relative to other periods. 
This problem can be sharply reduced by comparing the acceleration 
and deceleration of inflation with that of nominal GNP as it swings from 
expansion to contraction and back, so long as the inflation norm is not 
changing sharply from one cycle to the next. 
As an initial formulation, let the aggregate supply curve be expressed 
as follows, with all variables measured as average annual percent changes 
over a business-cycle expansion or contraction:  5 
( 1)  p  =  IS(q -q*)  +  PA +  PN, 
where 
p  =  rate of change in GNP deflator 
PA =  direct impact of autonomous supply shocks on the rate of change 
in the GNP deflator (or other price measure) 
PN  =  inflation norm 
q =  rate of change in real GNP 
q*  =  rate  of  change  in  potential  GNP. 
The aggregate supply curve (equation  1)  is the first-difference form of 
either a modified early Keynesian or a speed-limit model of inflation: the 
change in prices is equal to the norm rate of inflation plus any direct im- 
pact of autonomous supply shocks plus a component that depends on the 
change in output relative to potential. This formulation can explain much 
(but, as shown below, not all)  of the behavior of inflation during expan- 
sions and contractions of peacetime cycles through the mid-1960s. 
The inflation norm, as suggested by Okun and Perry, is a relatively 
stubborn and not  easily  changed underlying rate of  inflation,  around 
which demand and supply developments generate deviations in the actual 
inflation rate.6 The norm rate of inflation is "pure" inflation; deviations 
around the norm both result from and give rise to changes in resource 
allocation. The hypothesis is that the norm changes in response to sig- 
nificant and persistent deviations in actual inflation from the norm but 
does not adapt continuously and does not shift significantly in response to 
5. Throughout  this paper uppercase  letters represent  levels of a variable;  lower- 
case, rates of change. 
6.  Arthur  M. Okun, Prices  and Quantities:  A Macroeconomic  Analysis  (Brook- 
ings, 1981), and George L. Perry,  "Inflation  in Theory and Practice,"  BPEA, 1:1980, 
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moderate deviations of actual inflation from the norm unless those devia- 
tions are maintained for long periods (as happened in the late 1960s). 
There is no attempt here to make a doctrinal issue about the concept 
of an inflation norm. Rather, it is a useful way of expressing the proposi- 
tion that the complex of backward- and forward-looking forces that in- 
fluenced current wage and price setting in most peacetime cycles  since 
1900  tended to persist with only modest  changes across a number of 
cycles. 
Inflationary supply shocks can be of two kinds: a leftward shift in the 
supply schedule of some major sector like food or energy, or a noncycli- 
cal  change in productivity growth. Supply shocks  have  four kinds  of 
effects: given a "sticky" PN they raise the aggregate supply curve; while 
this is occurring, output growth is depressed relative to  the change in 
nominal aggregate demand; in turn, depending on the magnitude of  &  in 
equation 1 above, some demand-induced offsetting reduction in the price 
level occurs if the growth in nominal GNP is unchanged; finally, to the 
extent that any of the transitional inflation from the price-level adjust- 
ment becomes incorporated into the norm, there is a long-term increase 
in the amount of nominal GNP change needed to achieve any given real 
growth. If  a period of  reduced productivity growth is  not  merely the 
transition phase of a one-time downward shift in the level of productivity, 
but a long-term reduction in growth, two additional (and related)  effects 
occur:  the actual and norm rate of price inflation rises relative to the 
actual and norm rate of wage inflation, and the rate of growth of poten- 
tial slows so that aggregate demand must subsequently rise more slowly 
than before if inflationary demand pressures are to be avoided. Finally, 
if the reduction in productivity growth initially leads to a period of higher 
price inflation, because demand restraints are not sufficient to offset the 
initial upward shift in the aggregate output supply curve, the wage norm 
may be ratcheted upward. 
Expressing p as a function of nominal GNP change yields 
(  a)  p =  l  [y -  (q*  +  PA +  PN)] +  PA +  PN, 
where y is the growth rate of nominal GNP. Assuming no autonomous 
supply  shocks,  inflation deviates  from the  norm in  proportion  to  the 
excess of nominal GNP changes over the change in potential GNP evalu- 
ated at the norm rate of inflation. Charles L. Schultze  529 
Table 1. Moving  Average  of Change  in GNP Deflator,  Peacetime  Cycles  Excluding 
the Great  Depression,  1901-66 
Percent  per year 
Three-year  Five-year  Three-year  Five-year 
Year  average  average  Year  average  average 
1901  2.4  2.1  1949  6.3  7.4 
1902  2.4  2.7  1950  2.7  7.3 
1903  1.3  2.3  1951  2.6  5.5 
1904  1.9  1.9  1952  3.4  3.2 
1905  1.4  1.4  1953  3.2  2.1 
1906  2.0  2.1  1954  1.4  2.6 
1907  3.0  2.3  1955  1.7  2.6 
1908  2.1  1.9  1956  2.2  1.9 
1909  2.2  2.3  1957  2.9  2.3 
1910  1.8  2.5  1958  2.8  2.3 
1911  1.4  1.6  1959  2.5  2.6 
1912  1.9  1.7  1960  1.9  2.5 
1913  0.8  1.7  1961  1.6  2.0 
1914  1.8  1.3  1962  1.5  1.7 
1963  1.4  1.7 
1923  -7.3  -2.4  1964  1.6  1.5 
1924  -1.6  -1.4  1965  1.7  1.6 
1925  1.5  -4.2  1966  2.3  2.1 
1926  -0.3  -0.8 
1927  -0.7  0.1 
1928  -1.0  -0.5 
1929  -0.5  -0.2 
Sources: Before 1909 the Kendrick series for GNP were used, as published in U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
Long Term Econtomttic  Growth,  1860-1965 (U.S. Government Printing Office,  1966), p. 166. After 1909 the 
data are from the national income and product accounts. 
As long as PA is relatively unimportant and neither the norm nor po- 
tential growth change significantly from one observation to the next, then 
(2)  Ap/,Ay =  , 
where X is  3/(1 +  ,B),  and is referred to here as the flexibility coefficient. 
While changes in PN or the occurrence of supply shocks will reduce the 
accuracy of A?p/Ay  as an index of the cyclical sensitivity of inflation to 
changes in aggregate demand, so long as the shocks or norm changes are 
infrequent and modest in size, the errors will not be large. Table 1 shows 
three- and five-year moving averages of the average annual change in the 
GNP deflator during the peacetime cycles through  1966  excluding the 
Great Depression. Except for the years when the moving averages were 530  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
Table 2. Cyclical  Impact  of Farm  Prices,  Selected  Periods,  1900-66 
Percentage  points 
Chzange  in GNP deflator 
minulls change  in private 
Period  nionfarni  deflator 
1900-03  0.7  (0)a 
1904-07  0.2 
1908-10  0.9 
1911-13  0.3 
1924-26  0.6 
1927-29  -0.1 
1949-53  -0.2 
1954-57  0.0 
1958-59  -0.1 
1960-66  0.3 
Source:  Same  as  table  1 for  GNP  deflator  and  after  1909  for  nonfarm  deflator.  See  appendix  A  for 
earlier  data  on  farm  prices. 
a.  For  1901-03. 
affected by the immediate postwar inflation-when,  as I  argue below, 
actual inflation rates were not incorporated into either the norm or long- 
term expectations-the  data suggest that shifts in PN were unlikely to 
have been frequent. And,  as table 2  shows,  the direct contribution of 
relative farm prices to the GNP deflator was also modest in all the cyclical 
expansions except three (1900-03,  1908-10,  and 1924-26),  and in the 
first of  those  the rise in farm prices was partially reversed during the 
expansion. 
Before examining regression estimates of the value of X, an alternative 
measure of its value was calculated. By averaging the values of p and y 
in expansions and subtracting them from the averages of p and y in con- 
tractions, a "mean"  A\plAy ratio was calculated for various periods.  This 
mean should provide a useful rough measure of X so long as any change 
in pN affects an equal number of expansions and contractions. This con- 
dition appeared to have been met in the prewar period. But in the postwar 
years through 1966-the  period being examined-there  was an apparent 
downward shift in PN in the early 1960s, which tended to lower the calcu- 
lated mean Ap/zAy. To calculate the mean Ap/zAy for the postwar period, 
7.  The averages for p and y were unweighted;  each expansion and contraction 
is a unit of observation. Charles L. Schultze  531 
Table 3.  Change in Inflation and Nominal GNP  Growth, Prewar and Postwar 
Peacetime Contractions, 1900-66,  Total Economy and Nonfarm Sectora 
Percent change per year or ratio 
Total economy  Private n2onfarm  sectorb 
Period and measure  p  y  Ap/Ay  p  y  Ap/Ay 
Prewar  cycles  (excluding 
Great  Depression) 
Expansions  1.7  7.4  ...  1.2  7.8 
Contractions  -0.7  -2.1  ...  -0.4  -2.7  ... 
Change(Ap,Ay)  2.3  9.5  0.25  1.6  10.5  0.15 
Great Depression 
(1929-41) 
Expansions  ...  ...  ...  1.6  11.5 
Contractions  ...  ...  ...  -2.2  -10.8  ... 
Change (Ap, Ay)  ...  ...  ...  3.8  22.3  0.17 
Postwar  cycles 
Expansions  2.8  8.0  ...  2.8  8.6 
Contractions  1.5  1.7  ...  1.4  1.2 
Change(Ap,Ay)  1.2  6.3  0.19  1.4  7.4  0.19 
Source:  Same  as  table  I for  total  GNP;  see  appendix  A  for  private  nonfarm  GNP. 
a.  The  p and  y  variables  denote  the  average  annual  rate  of  change  in  the  GNP  deflator  and  in  nominal 
GNP,  respectively,  during  expansions  or contractions. 
b.  GNP  less  gross  product  originating  in  the farm  and  goveriiment.  For  1900-09,  for  whiclh estimates  of 
government  GNP  in  current  dollars  are  unavailable,  nonfarm  GNP  is  used.  See  appendix  A.  Here  and  in 
other  tables,  totals  may  not  add  due  to  rounding. 
c.  The  measures  of p, .), Ap, and  A y are based  on  calculationis  that  adjusted  the  1961-66  data  for  a down- 
ward  norm  shift.  See  the  text  for  an  explanation. 
the average values for p and y in 1961-66  were each raised by 1.0 per- 
centage point to adjust for the downward shift in the inflation norm.8 
The results of this calculation of the mean are shown in table 3. The 
data in this table indicate that for the nonfarm economy there was no 
substantial change between  the  pre-1929  and postwar periods  in  the 
average acceleration or deceleration of  inflation relative to  changes in 
nominal GNP growth. (The postwar Ap/Ay ratios calculated without a 
norm shift adjustment were 0.16  for both the total GNP and the private 
nonfarm GNP.)  In neither period was the response of inflation large. In 
the prewar cycles real farm prices moved procyclically. The price support 
programs after the Second World War ended this phenomenon.  As  a 
8.  As  discussed  below,  the  norm,  as  reflected  in  the  nonfarm  deflator,  was  as- 
sumed to fall from 2.5 to  1.5 between  the  1949-60  and the  1961-66  periods. 532  Brookings Papers on Economic  A ctivity, 2:1981 
consequence,  the  relative acceleration and deceleration  of  the  overall 
GNP deflator was somewhat larger in the prewar period than in postwar 
cycles. The swing in inflation, relative to the swing in nominal GNP, was 
little different in the cyclical phases of the Great Depression than in pre- 
war or postwar cycles, a surprising  result given the huge size of the swings 
and the level of unemployment at the troughs in 1933 and 1938. 
"Weighted deceleration" measures can be  calculated  to  show  what 
contribution contractions in the economy have made toward slowing in- 
flation. They are generated by multiplying the average annual decelera- 
tion that characterized contractions in each period by the relative number 
of years spent in contraction. In the prewar period, fourteen years were 
spent in expansion and six in contraction, so the deceleration is multiplied 
by the ratio 6/14  (0.43).  The ratio in the postwar period is half that large 
(0.21).  While  price flexibility relative to  changes  in  demand was  no 
smaller in the postwar period than in the prewar years  (for  nonfarm 
GNP),  high employment policies reduced the deceleration of inflation in 
two ways:  deceleration of  nominal GNP  averaged about two-thirds as 
large during recessions  (-7.4  percent versus -10.5  percent),  and oc- 
curred only half as frequently. Thus in terms of determining the average 
rate of inflation for the period as a whole, deceleration of nominal GNP 
contributed only one-third as much as in the prewar period. 
These calculations implicitly assume that the cyclical deceleration did 
not substantially affect the PN of the subsequent expansion. I argue below 
that this is a reasonable assumption. But to the extent that the norm was 
kept higher than it otherwise would have been, the "effective" demand 
deceleration of the postwar period was even less than one-third as great 
relative to prewar years. 
The rough stability between prewar and postwar periods of the coeffi- 
cient linking changes in inflation to changes in aggregate demand and the 
sharp reduction in the variability of  aggregate demand in the postwar 
period  are both  strikingly indicated  in  another way:  in  the  1954-66 
period the ratios of the standard deviations of nominal GNP, real GNP, 
and the deflator to the standard deviations in prewar years (1900-14  and 
1923-29)  were all 0.5.9 
9.  Based  on  data  for  the  private  nonfarm  sector.  See  also  the  means  and  stan- 
dard  deviations  for  various  subperiods  between  1890  and  1980  given  by  Gordon, 
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REGRESSION  EQUATIONS 
In estimating the response of inflation to changes in aggregate demand 
through ordinary least squares regressions there are problems of poten- 
tial bias from both measurement and specification errors. 
If changes in nominal GNP are truly exogenous, positive errors in the 
price terms, in the  stochastic version of  equation  1  a, will  show  up as 
negative changes in real GNP and vice versa. In that case, fitting p against 
y (equation  la)  will give an unbiased estimate of X, and fitting p against 
q (equation 1)  will give a downward bias to the estimate of /3 and hence 
of X.  But specifying nominal GNP to be completely exogenous requires 
some stringent conditions. It would require, for example, that the mone- 
tary and fiscal authorities be committed to a fixed path of nominal GNP 
and neither overshoot nor undershoot when price surprises take place. 
Even the direction of possible bias is likely to be unknown; over a period 
as long as a business cycle, price increases that are larger than normal may 
induce policy responses that subsequently depress nominal GNP as well 
as real GNP. 
In  fitting p  to  q,  an  additional measurement problem  may  also  be 
present. The majority of the estimates of real GNP are made by deflating 
estimates of  nominal expenditures with prices. Measurement errors in 
prices produce exactly offsetting quantity errors, biasing downward the 
X estimates from equation 1. 
Finally and most important, it is clearly wrong to fit Pt against Yt (as 
distinct from qt)  when there is reason to believe that some component of 
p is, in period t, exogenous to movements in aggregate demand. The dis- 
cussion above pointed out that if some part of  inflation represents in- 
herited momentum or a relatively sticky norm, then fitting Pt  to Yt will 
yield a spuriously large coefficient on yt;  even if Yt is strictly exogenous, 
p will be regressed on some component of p. Hence the necessity arises 
either to operate with second  differences of  prices  (zAp =  XAzy) or to 
specify the dependent variable as a deviation from the norm or the in- 
herited inflation rate (p  -  PN) '1 
10.  Gordon's  recent papers use  as the  main  dependent  variable  the  excess  of  the 
growth  of  nominal  GNP  over  potential  GNP  (y  -  q*),  compared  to  the  measure 
(y  -  q*-  PN)  used in this paper. See  Robert  J. Gordon,  "A Consistent  Characteri- 
zation"  and "Output Fluctuations  and  Gradual  Price  Adjustment." 534  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
To test the sensitivity of the X coefficient to alternative specifications 
and possible measurement errors, three alternative variables were used to 
measure aggregate demand: y, q, and two new variables, n and n*  rates 
of  change  in  actual  and potential  aggregate hours  worked.  The  new 
variables are surrogates for q and q* that are free of the problem of bias 
from measurement error. Both the equation 2 format (A)  and the equa- 
tion 1 format were used, resulting in the following variants: 
Independent 
variable  Equation 
y  Ap  aO  +  X  Ay 
(P  PN)  =  a  +X  (y  -  q* -  PN) 
q  Ap =  bo  + ,BAq 
(p -  PN)  =  b,  +  (q  -  q*) 
n  Ap =co  +  8 An 
(P-PN)  =c1+8  (n  -n*) 
The estimated coefficients were then used to calculate alternative esti- 
mates of X, the response of inflation to changes in nominal GNP.  The 
relation between the coefficients is 
Xy=X,  Xq  =7 
1 +- 
where the subscripts on X represent the aggregate demand variable used 
in estimating X. The coefficient p  relates n to q from a simple productivity 
equation of the form 
(x  -  x*)  (q  -q 
x  =  (q  -n), 
where x and x* are actual and potential productivity change." 
The choice of PN is controversial, but as table  1 suggests, the possi- 
bilities for error are not large. On the basis of arguments by Okun and 
11. This productivity equation (with cycle phases as the observation period) 
yielded a 0  of 0.36 in the prewar cycles and 0.32 when prewar and postwar cycles 
were combined. Charles L. Schultze  535 
Perry and evidence developed below, PN is fairly stable. It does not change 
easily.  It  is  not  a  mechanical  concept,  responding smoothly  to  some 
weighted average of past data. Thus, rather than use the actual moving 
average of table  1, which suggests a fairly smooth  adaptive process, I 
kept PN the same through the major subperiods of the prewar and post- 
war cycles,  estimating it by the  average rate of  price change over the 
subperiod (ignoring the small price decline of  the  1920s).  While eco- 
nomic agents obviously did not know the averages before they were estab- 
lished, the averages do not differ much from a four- or five-year moving 
average (except during the periods immediately following the two post- 
war adjustments, when, I later argue, the actual price changes were not 
indicators of longer-term expectations).  The estimated PN and q* in per- 
cent per year are shown below for the private nonfarm economy.'2 
PN  q 
1900-14  1.3  4.1 
1923-29  0.0  3.8 
1949-60  2.5  3.9 
1961-66  1.5  3.8 
The first point about the regression estimates of X for nonfarm GNP, 
shown in table 4, is that they are relatively close together. By any mea- 
sure, X has always been relatively small. The second point is that inclusion 
of the postwar cycles (through 1966)  does not change the estimates at all. 
The Ap regressions are also close to the means shown in table 3. The third 
point is that the value of X is quite insensitive to whether y, q, or n is used 
to estimate it. The precise values of the coefficients in the equations based 
on aggregate hours worked are undoubtedly affected by the crudity of the 
productivity equation used to  identify the  structural coefficient in the 
formulation based on hours worked. Nevertheless, the fact that equations 
based on aggregate  hours worked give about the same value as the y and q 
formulations suggests that the X estimates generated by q are not being 
dominated by collinearity between measurement errors in p and q. The X 
estimates from the first-difference  formulation, using p  - PN,  are univer- 
12.  For  the prewar period,  q:  was  estimated  in two  constant  segments  (1900-14 
and  1923-29)  as the  growth  in private  nonfarm  GNP  between  years  with  roughly 
similar  unemployment,  using  an  Okun's  law  adjustment  for  the  remaining  differ- 
ences.  In each postwar  subperiod  the average  growth  in the series on potential  GNP 
prepared by the Council  of  Economic  Advisers  was  used; potential  for  private  non- 
farm  GNP  was  estimated  by  subtracting  actual  government  and  farm  GNP  from 
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Table 4.  Response of Price Inflation to Changes in Aggregate Demand in Peacetime 
Cycles, Private Nonfarm Economy, 1900-66a 
Period  and method  Form  of depenzdent 
used to estimate X  variableb  Value of X 
Prewar cycles 
X, regression  Ap  0.15  (0.73) 
(P  -  PN)  0.12  (0.39) 
Xq regression  Ap  0.14  (0.63) 
(P  -  PN)  0.10  (0.23) 
X. regression  Ap  0.13  (0.51) 
(P  -PN)  0.09  (0.18) 
Prewar and postwar cycles 
X, regression  Ap  0.15  (0.75) 
(P  -PN)  0.13  (0.47) 
Xq regression  Ap  0.15  (0.66) 
(P  -  PN)  0.11  (0.32) 
X, regression  Ap  0.13  (0.60) 
(P  -  PN)  0.10  (0.29) 
Sources:  Author's  computations  based  on  data  as  described  in appendix  A. 
a.  Excluding  the  Great  Depression. 
b.  The  X  =  Ap/Aj  denotes  changes  in  the  rate  of  inflation  relative  to  changes  in  aggregate  demand. 
The  subscripts  y,  q, and  ni represent  the aggregate  demand  variable  used  in estimating  X, namely  the rates  of 
change  in nominal  GNP,  real GNP,  and  aggregate  hours  worked,  respectively.  For  the  regression  estimates 
the numbers  in parentheses  are the R2 of  the regression.  See  text for  the form  of the Xy,  Xq,  and X. regressions. 
sally  lower  than  their  counterparts from  second-difference  equations 
(using zAp). 
In the next two sections the formulation developed above is applied to 
a cyclical analysis of wholesale and consumer prices and wages. 
CYCLICAL  FLEXIBILITY  OF  WHOLESALE 
AND  RETAIL  PRICES 
In a careful and detailed analysis, Phillip Cagan demonstrates that the 
magnitude of  cyclical fluctuations in wholesale  prices declined sharply 
between the prewar and postwar periods.'3 In particular, the magnitude 
of the deceleration of wholesale prices from cyclical expansion to con- 
traction has declined substantially. Cagan's comparison of price move- 
ments in mild cycles led him to conclude that wholesale prices have be- 
13. Phillip Cagan, "Changes  in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices." Charles L. Schultze  537 
Table 5.  Summary Measures of Cyclical Price Flexibility,  Peacetime Cycles, 1900-66a 
Consumer  Whzolesale 
Deflator  price index  price index 
Private  Exclud-  Inidus- 
Period  and measure  GNP  nonfarm  Total  ing  food  Total  trial 
Mean annual  change  (percent  per year) 
Prewar  cycles 
Expansions  1.7  1.2  1.6  0.4  2.6  2.1 
Contractions  -0.7  -0.4  -0.7  -0.6  -3.5  -6.1 
Change(Ap)  2.3  1.6  2.3  1.0  6.1  8.2 
Postwar  cycles 
Expansions  2.7  2.8  2.0  2.3  1.7  2.4 
Contractions  1.5  1.4  1.6  1.5  0.6  0.2 
Change  (Ap)  1.2  1.4  0.4  0.7  1.2  2.2 
Flexibility  coefficients  (Ap/Ay) 
Prewar  cycles  0.25  0.15  0.24  0.10  0.64  0.78 
Postwar  cycles  0.19  0.19  0.06  0.10  0.18  0.29 
Source: GNP and private nonfarm deflators-table  3; wholesale price index and consumer price index 
since  1913-U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics; consumer price index from  1900 to  1913-Albert  Rees, 
Real  Wages  in  Maniufacturinig,  1890-1914  (Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 74. 
a.  Excluding the  Great Depression.  Flexibility coefficients for  private nonfarm  deflator, industrial 
wholesale price index, and consumer price index excluding food are based on private nonfarm GNP;  all 
others, on total GNP. 
come less flexible not only absolutely but in relation to changes in aggre- 
gate demand. 
Mean Ap/Ay ratios for wholesale  and consumer prices are shown in 
table 5, based on calculations that adjust the data, as explained earlier, 
for a downward norm shift in 1961-66.  From the last two columns of 
table 5  it is  clear that Cagan's findings about the  absolute  decline  in 
wholesale price flexibility also hold up in terms of wholesale price changes 
relative to  changes in nominal GNP-the  flexibility coefficient for the 
wholesale price index declined substantially between the prewar and post- 
war periods. The flexibility of the total consumer price index also declined 
sharply. Virtually all the decline in the consumer price index (CPI),  how- 
ever, was due to reduced flexibility in the food component. The flexibility 
of the CPI excluding food was already very small in the prewar period 
and remained at about the same level in the postwar years.14 
14. The greater prewar flexibility of farm prices had a proportionately greater 
effect  on the total CPI than on the total GNP deflator  since the weight of farm prices 
was larger  in the CPI than in the deflator. 538  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1981 
How can Cagan's findings about wholesale prices be reconciled with 
the evidence that price flexibility for the private nonfarm deflator and for 
the CPI less food has not changed significantly and that the flexibility of 
the total GNP deflator has only fallen slightly? To some extent the reduc- 
tion in wholesale price flexibility may be a statistical mirage. In earlier 
years commodities with flexprice characteristics (such as farm products, 
some metals, and raw materials generally) or semi-flex price characteris- 
tics (like cotton textiles, lumber) made up a larger fraction of the index 
weights. And before 1947 the index did not include any significant cover- 
age of machinery and equipment, whose prices (especially the list prices 
that are entered in  the wholesale  price index,  WPI)  are quite sticky. 
Appendix B to this paper discusses the reasons why it is unlikely that the 
decline  in  the  responsiveness  of  wholesale  prices  was  wholly  due  to 
changes in the statistical composition of the index, but reflects, at least to 
some extent, a real decline in their flexibility relative to changes in aggre- 
gate demand. 
The change in the cyclical behavior of wholesale prices cannot be at- 
tributed principally to  changing wage  behavior.  As  discussed  below, 
wages have probably become less cyclically sensitive, but the change has 
been far smaller than in the case of wholesale prices. Even in the prewar 
period the cyclical flexibility of wages was far less than that of wholesale 
prices. 
Other than perishable crude foods  and a few smaller items, flexprice 
markets for consumer goods probably never existed. Customer markets 
for consumer goods  and services have always been the usual arrange- 
ment. But a number of factors may have caused many wholesale markets 
to take on more of the characteristics of customer markets. Products have 
become less homogenous,  more differentiated, and more complex.  Im- 
proved transportation has led to the growth of  national brand names, 
nationwide markets, customer servicing by the manufacturer, supplier- 
owned retail outlets, and the need for manufacturers to price with con- 
sumer loyalty in mind. The spread of consumer credit supplied by goods 
producers has worked in the same way. And the growth of large national 
and regional retail chains, which sell in customer markets and buy in large 
quantities, often under longer-term contracts from suppliers in national 
markets, may have helped push back to the wholesale level the customer- 
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THE  BEHAVIOR  OF  WAGES 
Attempts to measure the cyclical flexibility of wages are confounded 
by the problem that, for most of the period covered, no true wage index 
exists.  For  the  postwar  period  aggregate wage  indexes  are  available 
that exclude overtime in manufacturing and adjust for shifts in employ- 
ment among industries. But within individual firms the average hourly 
earnings statistic is unweighted. Changes in reported average hourly earn- 
ings are influenced not only by changes in wage or salary rates, but by 
changes in the skill mix within the firm and by the effect of layoffs and 
recalls in a seniority-based system on average pay in firms with pay sys- 
tems related to length of employment. An inspection of the distribution 
of average hourly earnings changes by individual establishments within 
specific industries suggests that the nonwage factors have an important 
effect on the movement of reported average hourly earnings during cycles. 
If the errors introduced by the nonwage influences were highly sys- 
tematic across the eighty years of cycles that this paper analyzes, at least 
the relative wage flexibility of prewar versus postwar cycles  would be 
ascertainable. But  there is  surely a  strong likelihood  that layoffs  and 
hiring in a seniority-based system and pay according to length of employ- 
ment were a smaller factor in the early years when unions were far less 
important, both directly in numbers and indirectly in their influence on 
nonunion compensation structures. And the cyclical impact of such pay 
and  layoff  practices  on  average  hourly  earnings  is  unambiguous-it 
lowers  the  reported deceleration  of  wages  during contractions.15 The 
wage-flexibility coefficients shown in table 6 for various measures of wage 
and compensation change should be interpreted with these limitations in 
mind. 
For the private nonfarm economy as a whole, data on wage changes are 
scant in the prewar period. Lebergott's series for "average annual earn- 
ings of full-time equivalent employees" was divided by a series developed 
by Kendrick and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)  on average hours 
worked to derive a series for average hourly earnings.16  The underlying 
15. The new occupation-weighted  employment  cost index has only been available 
since late 1975, and, in any event, it is not clear that the occupation-weighted  struc- 
ture completely eliminates the problem. 
16. Full-time equivalent  earnings are defined as earnings of full-time employees 
working at weekly hours customary  to the time and industry.  Thus annual full-time 540  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Table 6. Cyclical  Wage  Flexibility,  Peacetime  Cycles, 1900-66 
Percent  change  per year or ratio 
Average hourly earnings 
Private nonfarm  Manufacturing 
Lebergott, 
Period and measure  adjusteda  Wojtinsky  Rees/BLSb 
Prewar cycles 
Expansions  3. 3  2.6  3.0 
Contractions  1.8  1.3  0.4 
Change  (Aw)  1.5  1.3  2.6 
Flexibility  coefficientsc  (Aw/Ay)  0.15  0.12  0.25 
Adjusted average hourly earnings 
Adjusted  Private 
compensationd  nionfarmd  Manufacturinge 
Postwar cycles 
Expansions  4.8  4.4  4.4 
Contractions  4.0  3.7  3. 3 
Change (Aw)  0.8  0.8  1.1 
Flexibility  coefficientsc (Aw/Ay)  0.11  0.10  0.16 
Sources:  Lebergott  series-U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States:  Colonial 
Timiies to  1970  (GPO,  1975),  pt.  1, series  724,  tables  D722-27,  p.  164,  and  Long  Termn  Economnic Growth, 
1860-1965, pp. 192-93; Wojtinsky series-W.  S. Wojtinsky and Associates, Employmenett anid Wages  in the 
Uniited States (The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), table 16, p. 584; Rees series-Albert  Rees, "Patterns  of 
Wages, Prices and Productivity," in Charles A. Myers, ed., Wages,  Prices, Profits and  Productivity  (American 
Assembly, Columbia University, 1959), pp.  11-35; and postwar series-Bureau  of Labor Statistics and 
national income and product accounts. 
a.  The Lebergott series for average annual earnings for full-time employees was divided by a Kendrick- 
BLS series on average hours worked to derive an average hourly earnings series. 
b.  Rees series through 1919; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics series since then. 
c.  Calculated using the deceleration of private nonfarm GNP. 
d.  Adjusted for overtime in manufacturing and for  interindustry employment shifts, as explained in 
the text. 
e.  Adjusted for overtime. From 1964 on, a manufacturing series adjusted for industry mix is also avail- 
able. It deviates only slightly from the straight-time hourly earnings measures and suggests that inter- 
industry shifts were relatively unimportant in influencing the data. 
Lebergott series on full-time  equivalent earnings was itself  aggregated 
from nine individual industry series using constant employment weights. 
Because  the payment of  higher hourly rates for  overtime and private 
equivalent earnings fluctuate cyclically with hours of work in the industry;  dividing 
full-time earnings by average hours of work of full-time employees should correct 
for this. However, the figure for average hours worked is presumably influenced  by 
the proportion  of people working  part time, and so may overstate the cyclical move- 
ment in hours appropriate  to correct the full-time equivalent earnings data. Hence 
the estimate in table 6 may understate the cyclical movement in this wage series 
during  the prewar  period. Charles L. Schultze  541 
fringe benefits were probably rare in the prewar period, this series should 
be roughly comparable to the adjusted average hourly earnings index of 
the postwar period.17 
The Rees series for manufacturing shown in table 6 is unweighted, but 
according to  Rees  a nine-industry weighted series from  1906  to  1914 
seemed to make little difference in the cyclical behavior of the index.18 
For the postwar period, two wage series are used for the total private 
nonfarm economy. The first is the average hourly earnings series adjusted 
by the BLS for overtime in manufacturing and interindustry shifts. The 
second is an hourly compensation index, constructed along the lines sug- 
gested earlier by Gordon: it is the adjusted hourly earnings index multi- 
plied by the ratio of compensation to wages and salaries in the national 
income accounts.19 
The postwar estimates of wage flexibility in table 6 are based on the 
concepts underlying table 3; the change in both wages and nominal GNP 
was adjusted upward by 1.0 percentage point in the 1961-66  expansion. 
Subject to the major qualifications discussed above, the data show that 
for the nonfarm economy as a whole wage flexibility in the prewar period, 
which was not very great, fell to an even lower level in the postwar period. 
Sachs' analysis of wage movements since the 1890s also concludes that 
wage changes have become less flexible since the prewar years.20  But be- 
cause he includes the years through 1976 with no adjustment for supply 
shocks, his measures of wage flexibility decline more than those shown 
above. Wage flexibility in manufacturing exceeded  that for the overall 
economy in both periods; it, too, declined after the war. Wage flexibility 
was never large, but the combination of its smaller size and the lower 
amplitude of contractions in the postwar period produced a wage series 
that rose only slightly less in contractions than in expansions. 
The growth of multiyear contracts in the union sector of the economy 
is one obvious reason for the changed behavior. Flanagan has found, for 
17. See the ILebergott  series in U.S. Bureau  of the Census, Historical Statistics of 
the United States: Colonial  Times  to 1970  (U.S.  Government  Printing  Office,  1975), 
p. 164; the Kendrick-BLS  series is from Bureau  of the Census,  Long Term Economic 
Growth,  1860-1965  (GPO,  1966),  pp.  192-93. 
18. Albert Rees, "Patterns  of  Wages, Prices and Productivity,"  in Charles A. 
Myers, ed.,  Wages, Prices,  Profits,  and Productivity  (American  Assembly,  Columbia 
University,  1959),  pp.  11-35. 
19. See Robert  J. Gordon, "Inflation  in Recession and Recovery,"  BPEA, 1:1971, 
pp. 115-16. 
20.  Sachs, "The Changing Cyclical Behavior." 542  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  2:1981 
Table 7.  Cyclical Behavior of Real Wages, Peacetime Cycles,  1900-66 
Percent per year 
Mean annual change 
Comipensa- 
tion less 
Private  Consumer  Adjusted  Compensa-  consumer 
nonfarm  price  compensa-  tion less  price 
Period and measure  deflator  index  tion indexa  deflator  index 
Prewar cycles 
Expansions  1.2  1.6  3. 3  2.1  1.7 
Contractions  -0.4  -0.7  1.8  2.1  2.4 
Change  1.6  2.3  1.5  0.0  -0.7 
Postwar cycles 
Expansions  2.8  2.0  4.8  2.1  2.9 
Contractions  1.4  1.6  4.0  2.7  2.4 
Change  1.4  0.4  0.8  -0.6  0.5 
Sources: Tables 3 and 6. 
a.  An adjusted Lebergott series was used for the prewar period; for the postwar period, a compensation 
index like that developed by Gordon. See Robert J. Gordon, "Inflation in Recession and Recovery," BPEA, 
1:1971,  pp.  115-16. 
example, that union wages tended to be as responsive as nonunion wages 
to changes in economic conditions in the first year of a multiyear contract, 
but not in the remaining years.2' 
The finding that the flexibility of the nonfarm deflator did not decrease, 
while wage flexibility did, implies a somewhat changed cyclical behavior 
of real wages, as set forth in table 7. Measured against output prices (the 
nonfarm deflator) the reduced flexibility of nominal wages showed up as 
a tendency for real wages to rise faster in recessions relative to expansions 
than was the case in the prewar years. But because the prewar flexibility 
of farm and food prices disappeared in the postwar period, real wages 
measured against the total CPI tended to rise faster in expansions relative 
to contractions than they did before 1929. The data in table 7 also con- 
firm the well-known finding that real wages measured in product prices 
show no systematic procyclical tendencies. 
The fact that in both prewar and postwar periods real wages showed 
no major procyclical tendency has an important implication for sorting 
21.  Robert J. Flanagan, "Wage Interdependence  in Unionized Labor Markets," 
BPEA,  3:1976,  pp. 651-54. Charles L. Schultze  543 
out inflation theories. Under accelerationist theories, which are market 
clearing in expected prices, one of the two following alternatives must be 
invoked to account for expansions and contractions of output which per- 
sist over long periods of time: either there are "in-equilibrium" cyclical 
movements up and down the aggregate supply curve of labor resulting in 
procyclical swings of real wages, or the misperceptions, information lags, 
insularity, or whatever else it is that keeps perceived relative prices mis- 
takenly high (or low)  must somehow stubbornly persist over long periods 
of time in expansion after expansion (and similarly in contractions).  The 
noncyclicality of the movement in real wages clearly rules out the first 
alternative. 
In sum, the following findings have emerged about the flexibility of 
wages and prices relative to aggregate demand: 
Final goods prices, measured either by the GNP deflator or the CPI, 
were never very flexible even in the prewar period, and that flexibility de- 
clined in the postwar period. 
The decline in price flexibility in these indexes  can be  attributed to 
the behavior of farm and food prices. Government price-support policy 
in the postwar period largely eliminated the cyclical flexibility of  farm 
prices. The nonfarm GNP deflator and the CPI excluding food exhibited 
a small and roughly stable response to changes in aggregate demand in 
both prewar and postwar periods. 
Wage flexibility was  small  in  the  prewar period  and became  even 
smaller in the postwar period. Although nonfarm price flexibility was no 
smaller and wage flexibility declined, the absolute size of the decline in 
wage flexibility (from 0.15  to 0.11  for all nonfarm workers)  was suffi- 
ciently smaller that it did not significantly alter the long-standing observa- 
tion that there is little systematic cyclical movement in real wages. 
Implications for the Rational Expectations Model of the Economy 
The findings presented above about the flexibility of wages and prices 
relative to  aggregate demand are particularly relevant for the implica- 
tions of rational expectations and related theories that emphasize market- 
clearing price  and wage  behavior  combined  with  misperceptions  and 
information lags as an explanation of the response of inflation and output 544  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
to changes in aggregate demand. In a rational expectations world, eco- 
nomic  agents respond to  observed price changes in  two  ways:  to  the 
extent they believe the price movements represent general inflation, there 
is a zero response of output-that  is, a supply elasticity of zero. To the 
extent they believe the price movements represent "real" (that is, relative) 
changes, they respond along their various labor and output supply curves, 
with elasticities determined by the shape of those supply curves. 
The observed elasticity of individual economic agents' supply response 
is, therefore, a weighted average: a zero elasticity multiplied by the pro- 
portion of the price change they believe to be general, plus an equilibrium 
supply curve elasticity multiplied by the proportion of the price change 
they believe to be real or relative. The observed aggregate supply curve 
is an aggregation of the individual weighted averages.22  According to the 
theory, therefore, the  observed  short-run aggregate supply  curve is  a 
weighted average of a zero elasticity and an elasticity that represents an 
equilibrium movement along the economy's underlying short-run supply 
elasticities. If, for example, agents on average tended to perceive half the 
observed price movements as general inflation, an observed supply elas- 
ticity of, say, 5 would imply the existence of an underlying elasticity along 
an equilibrium path of twice that amount, or 10. 
How big is the weighted output elasticity actually observed over the 
course of business cycles? The low value of the flexibility coefficient esti- 
mated above for both prewar and postwar periods (between 0.15 and 0.19 
for nonfarm prices) implies a high value for the elasticity of the aggregate 
supply curve that simply cannot be accounted for in the rational expec- 
tations world. A  X of  this size implies  a response of the inflation rate 
(relative to the perceived inflation norm)  to output growth (relative to 
potential),  given by Al/(1  - A),  of  about 0.20.  The inverse of this re- 
22.  See the formulation by Robert E. Lucas, Jr., "Some International  Evidence 
on Output-Inflation  Tradeoffs,"  American  Economic  Review,  vol. 63 (June 1973), 
pp. 326-34.  If the response of an individual agent's output, Yt(Z),  to a perceived 
relative price is yt(Z)  =  y(pt(Z)  -  Pt)  +  Syty1(Z), where pt(Z)  is the locally ob- 
served  price whose relative component  has a variance  of T2, and Pt is the mean of the 
current  perceived general price level with variance of  a2,  then the observed aggre- 
gate supply curve is Yt =  Oy(Pt -  Pt)  +  8yt-,  where o is the weighting variable, 
equal to  T2/(T2  +  a2).  (Since the elasticity of  response to perceived changes in 
general prices is zero, the (1 -  o) weight for general price changes remains implicit 
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sponse (5)  defines the short-run elasticity of output on prices, that is, the 
elasticity of the short-run.aggregate supply curve. If, at one extreme, all 
deviations of actual inflation from the norm are assumed to be initially 
perceived as relative price changes, then according to rational expecta- 
tions doctrine the observed supply elasticity is also the underlying supply 
elasticity. If, however, some of the deviations are correctly interpreted as 
additional inflation, the underlying elasticity is higher than 5. But the im- 
plication that the underlying short-run elasticity  along  an equilibrium 
path traced out by the economy's supply curves is 5 or greater is extremely 
unrealistic. If the production function is Cobb-Douglas, the labor share 
of total income is designated as b, the elasticity of labor supply to per- 
ceived real wages is denoted as q, and the economy's combined short-run 
(capital-fixed)  aggregate supply elasticity along an equilibrium path is 
given by23 
ec =  br/[1  +  -(1  -  b)]. 
The value of  the combined elasticity for selected values of  b and 27  is 
shown below: 
b  Y  ec 
0.67  0.2  0.13 
0.67  0.5  0.29 
0.67  1.0  0.50 
0.75  2.0  1.0 
0.75  00  3.0 
0.86  00  6.1 
If the production function is not completely "putty-putty," the short-run 
elasticity consistent with any given labor share, b will be lower than that 
shown above. 
If, for example, the elasticity of the labor supply is generously esti- 
mated at 0.50  and the labor share at 0.67,  the combined elasticity, ec, is 
23. If LS  = a Wn,  where W is the wage rate, MC is marginal  cost, and Q is output, 
then for capital  fixed  at Ko, 
OQ  MC 
OMC *  =  e,  =  b1/[l  +  q(l  -  b)]. 
The (mainly insignificant) constants, appearing  in the equations from which X was 
derived,  were ignored as arising from price changes other than those generated by 
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0.29.  To bring the combined elasticity up to  1.0, a combination of un- 
realistically high assumptions (such as b =  0.75  and q =  2.0)  must be 
employed. And  to  obtain a combined  elasticity for equilibrium move- 
ments of 5 or higher, which is what the observed data imply in the ra- 
tional expectations model, the economy must consist of an infinitely elas- 
tic supply of Gordon's "yeoman barbers."24 
It is conceivable (although I believe highly unlikely)  that the addition 
of inventory buffers, intertemporal substitution, or the like to a market- 
clearing model including misperceptions might be able to explain the high 
observed  elasticity of  output response  to  cyclical  swings in  aggregate 
demand.25  But in that case the high elasticity of output (and its mirror 
image, a low elasticity of prices)  would be endemic to the system and 
would not be radically improved by a credible change in the policy re- 
gime. And I see no way that the observed elasticity can be explained as 
a  special  consequence  of  the  nature of  historical  expectations  about 
monetary or other macro policy, so as to argue that a different policy, in 
effect long enough to be credible, would have produced a lower elasticity. 
At one extreme it might be presumed that the historical policy regime and 
demand shocks were  such that economic  agents detected none  of  the 
above-norm inflation components in the individual price changes they ex- 
perienced. In that case, the theory interprets the observed output response 
as an underlying elasticity of 5. As one relaxes this extreme assumption in 
24.  Robert J. Gordon, "The Product Market and Macroeconomics: the Ne- 
glected Stepchild,"  paper presented at the Arthur M. Okun Memorial Conference, 
Columbia  University,  September  25-26, 1981. 
25. The early Lucas model, "Expectations  and the Neutrality of Money,"  with its 
emphasis on intertemporal  substitutions,  might be used to account for a high elas- 
ticity of labor supply during cyclical swings under two different expectational re- 
gimes. First, workers misperceive general wage increases as relative increases that, 
however, they expect to be temporary;  hence they shift the temporal  patterns  of their 
labor input to the present, saving their leisure for later periods of low real wages. 
But for workers to hold such expectations in the face of consistent contrary experi- 
ence that expansion gains in real wages are not subsequently  wiped out in contrac- 
tion would hardly be rational. Second, workers correctly perceive that part of their 
wage increase  has a component of general inflation,  but expect the price level to fall 
in the future, and hence supply more labor input currently  so they can accumulate 
liquid assets and enjoy the subsequent real capital gains. This interpretation  of the 
behavior of labor supply flies in the face of so many facts (such as the minuscule 
historical size of workers'  liquid asset holdings, the lack of any basis for expecting 
price level declines in the postwar period, and the cyclical behavior of  quit rates) 
that it cannot seriously be offered as an explanation for the large underlying elas- 
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the direction of more accurate inflation prediction, the implied under- 
lying elasticity must be supposed, by the theory, to be an even more un- 
realistically large number.26 
Models of the aggregate supply curve that emphasize price and wage 
stickiness and the existence of persistent disequilibriums and excess sup- 
plies-whatever  their other difficulties-have  no problem in accounting 
for the high observed elasticity of output relative to price. The observed 
movements do not imply a high elasticity of equilibrium movements along 
the economy's supply curves. 
The evidence presented above that nonf arm price flexibility did not 
substantially change between the prewar and postwar years raises another 
doubt about the ability of a rational expectations model to explain the 
cyclical behavior of inflation. 
The supposed effect of predictive or rational expectations  about the 
future course of monetary policy on the rate of inflation depends upon a 
chain of relations. These are the effects of 
(1)  the past and current behavior and pronouncements of the 
monetary authorities on the expected future course of policy, 
(2)  the  expected  monetary policy  on  the  expected  course  of 
aggregate demand, 
(3)  the expected course of aggregate demand on the expected 
future behavior of wages and prices, 
(4)  the  (mean)  expected behavior of future wages and prices 
on current wage and price decisions.27 
Even in a world in which economic agents have come to believe  (1) 
that monetary restraint  will indeed be pursued in the face of political diffi- 
culties and (2)  that this will be effective in reducing demand, their be- 
havior will be quite different depending on their expectations about (3) 
the resulting split between output reduction and inflation reduction, and 
(4)  the certainty with which they hold these views. 
26.  Perverse models of behavior are ruled out-that  is, the theory cannot be 
reconciled with the observed elasticity by supposing that agents believe positive 
individually  observed demand shocks to be systematically associated with negative 
aggregate  demand  shocks. 
27. The concept of a relatively sticky inflation  norm implies that the uncertainty 
with which expectations are held and the costs of  reducing that uncertainty are 
large enough so that, within some limited range, changes in the expected value of in- 
flation  have only a muted impact on current  behavior-in  effect, they are ignored in 
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A  monetary policy that credibly promises demand restraint will ob- 
viously yield more inflation reduction than one that does not. The his- 
tory from which rational economic agents draw their predictions is not 
one in which inflation is immune to changes in aggregate demand. But 
the impact of a firmly expected demand reduction on current wage and 
price behavior will be much smaller if that demand reduction is generally 
forecasted to  result principally in  lower  output  rather than  in  lower 
prices. In the face of a firmly expected reduction in the demand for its 
industry's product, the management of a firm is much less likely to lower 
prices if it expects that other firms will not lower prices in the face of 
lower demand than if the opposite expectation is prevalent. 
Proponents of rational expectations argue that the apparently sluggish 
inflation in mainline models derives from misleading reduced forms. The 
observed small coefficient that relates inflation to changes in aggregate 
demand arises from a structural system in which the response to an ex- 
pected "permanent" drop in nominal demand is  quite sizable, but has 
been masked in the aggregate data by the expectational consequences of 
an expected countercyclical monetary policy. 
Hence  if that expectational pattern were changed, economic  agents, 
distinguishing the "true" reduced forms28  from the misleading historical 
macro relations, would respond with substantial price and wage flexibility. 
The principal reason that the management of the putative firm cited above 
did not reduce prices in the past when nominal demand fell was that it 
did not expect the decline to last and, more important, did not expect the 
competition to expect the decline to last. But if such an outcome had been 
predicted,  management  would  have  anticipated  that  the  competition 
would expect the same thing, and all of them together would have lowered 
prices. 
Although the evidence is not conclusive, the results of this paper point 
to quite a different inference. In the prewar period, when monetary policy 
was not systematically harnessed in favor of  employment support and 
prolonged booms, the observed coefficients of final goods price inflation 
on changes in aggregate demand were not much different from what they 
were during 1950-66.  They were small in both periods. Although the co- 
efficient of wage flexibility has declined, it was never very large. The ob- 
served smallness of the coefficients, therefore, does not provide spurious 
information about price flexibility. In the past, when expectations about 
28.  The response of  inflation to an expected permanent lowering of  nominal 
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policy must have been quite different from what they are now, the coeffi- 
cients were only modestly different from what they are now. 
Thus far I have related cyclical changes in inflation solely to contem- 
poraneous changes in aggregate demand, with no role either for the level 
of a disequilibrium variable or for the influence of recent changes in infla- 
tion on current wage and price behavior; in other words, I have ignored 
the possibilities  of  both  Phillips curve and accelerationist effects. The 
following two sections deal with each of these influences in turn. 
The Level of Unemployment and the Gap 
Because the annual unemployment data for the earlier years of the 
century were indirectly estimated and are subject to large measurement 
errors, I have examined Phillips curve effects using the gap between actual 
and potential GNP  as an alternative excess  demand variable. In  addi- 
tion, an effort was made to convert Lebergott's raw unemployment data 
to a Perry weighted unemployment rate in order to make the unemploy- 
ment measure at least roughly consistent over time as an index of labor 
market tightness.29 
29. Two adjustments  were made to the Lebergott  data. First, his overall  unemploy- 
ment rate was converted to a nonagricultural  unemployment  rate. Farm unemploy- 
ment was unlikely  to be reported  as such, and the farm sector accounted  for about 40 
percent  of the labor force in 1900.  As a consequence,  the use of total labor force in the 
denominator  of the unemployment  rate substantially  understates  the rate of unem- 
ployment  in earlier  years  compared  to the postwar  period.  Thus 
URNA  =  [U/(CLF  -EA)], 
where  URNA  =  nonagricultural  unemployment  rate 
U  =  total  unemployment 
EA  =  agricultural  employment 
CLF  =  civilian labor force. 
Second, the relation between the Perry weighted unemployment  rate, URW,  and 
URNA  was fitted for the postwar  period as follows: 
URW  =  ao +  a,  URNA  +  a2  EMR  20(+), 
where  EMR  20(+)  is the ratio of employment  among males aged twenty and over to 
total employment.  Decennial census data for 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, and 1940 was 
interpolated  annually  to obtain prewar  estimates  of EMR  20(+),  which were used in 
combination  with URNA  to estimate  a prewar  Perry  weighted  unemployment  rate. The 
equation  for UR W above gave the following  results: 
UR  W =  -2.83  +  0.86 URNA  +  3.29 EMR 20(+), 
(-7.1)  (48.2)  (5.8) 
=  0.987. 
See the concept  of a weighted  unemployment  rate in George  L. Perry,  "Changing  Labor 
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When the inverse of the weighted unemployment rate (1/URW)  was 
added to  the equation, it took  a small and only marginally significant 
coefficient, added very little to the explanatory power of  the equation, 
but did lower the coefficient of the demand change variable.30  For ex- 
ample, compare the following  results, fitted in the prewar and postwar 
cycles excluding the Great Depression, with their private nonfarm coun- 
terparts in table 4: 
(3)  Ap =  0.16 +  0.15 Aq +  1.8 A(1/URW) 
(0.6)  (3.0)  (0.5) 
R2  =  0.64 
or 
(4)  (p -  PN) =  -0.14  +  0.13 (q -  q*) -  0.34 (1/URW) 
(-0.2)  (2.5)  (-0.1) 
R2  =  0.28. 
The coefficients on Ap/Aq  and (q  -  q*)  translate into a A,X  of 0.13  and 
0.12 for comparison with table 4. 
To look more closely at the reason for this failure of the Phillips curve 
variables to  contribute substantially to  the explanation  of  the  cyclical 
sensitivity of inflation during peacetime cycles, a "standard" augmented 
Phillips curve equation was formulated and fit to  annual data for the 
various periods and subperiods within the past eighty years.3' The basic 
30. The fact that the observation units are cycle expansions and contractions 
means the unemployment  data used in the regressions  are averages  of the unemploy- 
ment rates in each of those units. Although this reduces the variance of the unem- 
ployment variable, substantial  variance in the unemployment  series still remains, as 
shown in the following tabulation of URW during expansions and contractions: 
1900-3  4.6  1924  4.9 
1904  6.4  1925-26  1.5 
1905-07  2.3  1927  3.1 
1908  9.1  1928-29  3.0 
1909-10  6.5  1949  5.2 
1911  7.4  1950-53  2.4 
1912-13  4.5  1954  4.7 
1914  8.6  1955-57  3.4 
1958  5.9 
31. The unemployment  inverse is averaged for years t and (t -  1). The unem- 
ployment change variable, however, is not shifted backward;  it represents  the change 
between t and (t -  1). Because the behavior of prices and of wages during the two 
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results are shown in table 8, in which the dependent variable is the per- 
cent change in the private nonfarm deflator. 
In the prewar years the level of unemployment appears to have had 
no effect on the rate of inflation. The coefficients on unemployment for 
various subperiods are small and insignificant. These  results, however, 
are based  on  regressions that have  dummy variables during the  two 
war cycles when the unemployment rate was very low. When the World 
War I dummies are removed, the coefficient on 1/ URW for the 1900-40 
period rises to 7.1  (with a t-statistic of  1.2).32  On balance, the evidence 
suggests that during prewar peacetime years when the unemployment rate 
seldom,  and then only briefly, reached very low  levels,  Phillips  curve 
effects do not appear. This result is not due to the poor measurement of 
annual unemployment before 1940. For the 1902-40  period an equation 
containing the gap between potential and actual GNP  showed that the 
level of the gap had no significant influence on the inflation rate, but the 
change in the gap did. 
Rather sizable Phillips curve effects do appear, however, in  1954-66 
(and  equally  robustly in  equations through  1969).  And  these  effects 
hold up whether the unemployment variable is current or lagged, inverted 
or "straight." 
The  change  in  unemployment  had  a  significant effect  on  inflation 
throughout the period up to  1966,  and this effect appeared to be quite 
stable when the estimates were split into various subperiods, although its 
value is a little lower in the 1954-66  subperiod than in earlier years. The 
time cycles, dummy variables are entered for  1916-22  (1.0  in 1916-20;  -1.0  in 
1921-22)  and for 1941-47  (1.0 in 1941-45; -1.0  in 1946-47).  Dummies are also 
entered for the Korean War and Nixon price control periods. Finally, two adjust- 
ments were made to account for the direct and indirect effects of energy and food 
price increases: an estimate of the direct effect of domestic energy price increases 
on the private nonfarm deflator was subtracted from the dependent variable in 
1974-76 and 1979-80. This direct energy effect was measured  as the relative domes- 
tic energy price increase multiplied  by current  year quantities,  all taken as a percent 
of private nonfarm GNP and entered three-fourths  in the year of occurrence and 
one-fourth in subsequent  years. For 1973-80  the impact of food and energy price 
changes on the change in the chain-weighted  price index for personal consumption 
expenditures  was also entered as a separate variable, but one-third was entered in 
the year of  occurrence and two-thirds in  the subsequent years. (For  this latter 
variable  see appendix  A.) 
32. In World War II the dummies take on a negative value, reflecting  the effect 
of price and wage controls, and removal of the dummies does not contribute to a 
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Table 8.  Standard Augmented Phillips Curve Equations for the Private Nonfarm 
Deflator, Selected Periods, 1902-80a 
Summary statistic 
Independent  variables  -Durbi_  _ 
Durbmn- 
Period  l/URW  A  URW  P-i  ?2  Watson 
1902-80  1.56  -0.77  0.26  0.78  1.75 
(0.8)  (-6.7)  (3.8) 
1902-40  0.15  -0.57  0.10  0.87  2.23 
(0.1)  (-4.7)  (1.4) 
1902-54  1.20  -0.76  0.23  0.78  1.79 
(0.5)  (-5.5)  (2.9) 
1954-66  8.65  -0.57  0.66  0.63  2.00 
(2.6)  (-3.4)  (2.5) 
1965-80  1.11  0.14  0.51  0.69  1.85 
(0.2)  (0.2)  (2.1) 
1954-80  7.71  -0.49  0.67  0.84  2.10 
(2.5)  (-2.4)  (5.8) 
Peacetime  cycles 
onlyb  -5.94  -0.35  0.09  0.29  1.82 
(-2.0)  (-2.8)  (0.65) 
Almon lags on de- 
pendent variablec 
1954-66  12.24  -0.56  0.91  0.70  ... 
(4.2)  (-3.9)  (3.1) 
1965-80  9.05  0.35  0.83  0.82  ... 
(1.5)  (0.9)  (3.8) 
1954-80  11.38  -0.32  0.79  0.88  ... 
(4.3)  (-1.9)  (7.5) 
Sources:  Same  as table  2 for  the private  nonfarm  deflator;  the Perry weighted  unemployment  rate is based 
on  George  L.  Perry,  "Changing  Labor  Markets  and  Inflation,"  BPEA,  3:1970,  pp.  411-41. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  percent  change  in  the  private  nonfarm  deflator.  The  variable  UR W 
denotes  the  Perry  weighted  unemployment  rate;  see  note  29  for  a  description  of  the  series.  Not  all  coeffi- 
cients  are shown;  see  notes  31 and  32 for  a description  of  the dummy  variables.  The  numbers  in parentheses 
are  t-statistics. 
b.  These  years  are  1902-14,  1924-29,  and  1950-66.  The  exclusion  of  the  Korean  War,  during  which  in- 
flation  moved  counter  to  Phillips  curve  predictions,  does  not  significantly  improve  the  fit  of  this  equation. 
c.  The  lagged  dependent  variable  is entered  as  an  Almon  lag  with  linearly  declining  weights  constrained 
to  be  zero  in  the  fifth  year. 
magnitude of the coefficient on the change in unemployment is roughly 
consistent with the X coefficients developed earlier, which relate inflation 
to the rate of change in nominal GNP.33  In the 1970s only the lagged de- 
33. The Perry weighted unemployment rate changes by 0.86 point for each 1 
point change in total unemployment (see note 23). With an Okun's  law coefficient  of 
2.75 and the relation X = .,/(1  + ,B),  one can calculate that a coefficient  of 0.6 to 0.8 
on AURW  is equivalent  to a X  of 0.16 to 0.20, which is reasonably  close to the values 
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pendent variable does well,  as it picks up the longer-term speedup in 
inflation. 
In the prewar period only the change in unemployment was relevant 
to the determination of inflation while both the change and the level of 
unemployment influenced the rate of inflation in the subsequent period. 
This suggests, I believe, certain conclusions about the micro analytics of 
the inflation process. 
The association of the rate of inflation with the change in unemploy- 
ment or output (relative to potential)  that is found in both the cyclical 
and annual analysis implies a structure of wage  and price behavior in 
which an expansion of output, relative to potential, leads to a one-time 
increase in the level of prices. As pointed out earlier, that behavior does 
not arise from a change in prices relative to wages-a  classical movement 
of real wages along a downward sloping labor demand curve. The evi- 
dence presented in this paper confirms the findings of numerous other 
investigators that there is no systematic cyclical component to the move- 
ment of real wages. The behavior in question must stem from changes in 
nominal wages. 
Models of Wage Setting 
The model of wage determination set forth in Perry's 1980 paper ex- 
plains an important part of the systematic cyclical behavior of inflation 
described here.34  In a period of Keynesian unemployment employers who 
want to increase the size of their work force substantially and quickly, 
faster than can be handled by screening the existing flow of applicants, 
are forced to increase wages more than that called for by the existing 
wage norm to expand the pool of new recruits and raise average quality.35 
Summing across employers, this source of deviation in wage level is not 
34. See George Perry, "Inflation  in Theory and Practice,"  pp. 212-14. 
35. Some large firms in concentrated industries that are subject to substantial 
fluctuations  in demand tend to keep their wage levels higher than necessary to meet 
mean expected labor force requirements  in order to ensure that they always have an 
available  pool of qualified  applicants  to meet unexpected  demands.  See, for example, 
Charles L. Schultze, "Recent Inflation in the United States," in Study of Employ- 
ment,  Growth  and Price  Levels,  Study  Paper  1, 86 Cong.  1 sess.  (GPO,  1959),  pp. 
1-137; and Alfred Kuhn, "Market  Structures  and Wage-Push Inflation,"  Inadlustrial 
and  Labor  Relations  Review,  vol.  12  (January  1959),  p.  249.  This  phenomenon 
tends to moderate  and spread  out the macro wage increase associated with an expan- 
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a function of the level of unemployment but of the rate at which employ- 
ment is changing relative to the labor force. The greater the number of 
employers needing to expand their work force and the faster they wish 
to expand it, the greater is the aggregate initial deviation in the wage level 
from that required to meet the norm. 
The  initial wage increase will  lead  to  some  further imitative wage 
rises, as other firms guard against attrition of their existing work force 
by matching the increase in the wage level. But so long as the fall in un- 
employment does not eliminate a Keynesian pool  of willing applicants, 
and after the initiating firms have obtained their desired work force, there 
is no need for them to maintain the new wage differential. Maintenance 
of the old differential will keep their quit rates from rising and maintain 
their flow of new recruits at what it was originally. Indeed, to the extent 
that the  imitative wage  increases  are less  than  the  original ones,  the 
initiating firms can, after their new work force has been obtained, raise 
wages by somewhat less than the norm until the original differentials  have 
been restored. The overall response of the wage level to the change in 
unemployment is thereby muted. 
In this process the flow of new recruits, out of the pool of recruits who 
would in any event have been satisfied to work at a given firm with its 
existing wage structure, is speeded up and channeled to those particular 
firms that are expanding through a temporary increase in relative wages. 
The macro consequence is a one-time rise in the wage level relative to the 
level dictated by the norm. 
Okun models  the  same phenomenon  somewhat  differently.36  While 
employers, in the circumstances described above, do not need to maintain 
the newly opened wage differential, they observe the gradual spread of 
imitative wage movements of  others, implicitly project those  increases 
into the future, and conclude that they must offer a higher rate of increase 
in wages than in the past simply to maintain the old differential. 
In other words, both the Perry and Okun models depict a labor market 
operating off the labor supply curve in which firms need to offer a wage 
increase relative to the norm in order to raise the flow of recruits to the 
firm but do not need to maintain a differentially higher wage to sustain 
the enlarged stock of employment once it has been achieved  (again, so 
long as the Keynesian pool of unemployed has not been exhausted).  In 
Perry's model,  employers who  first raised wages observe the imitative 
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increase in wages elsewhere, and see it as a level adjustment. Their wage 
offers for the next period do not reflect a judgment that wages elsewhere 
will continue to rise at the recently observed rate. Okun's model assumes 
the opposite-the  observed imitative rise is seen as a continuing higher 
rate of wage inflation, not as a one-time level adjustment. A Phillips curve 
results. 
It is not surprising that the Perry model of the consequences of em- 
ployment expansion (during periods of Keynesian unemployment) should 
best fit the prewar period while the Okun model would have some rele- 
vance in the postwar years. The difference between the two comes down 
to whether employers see imitative wage increases as a level adjustment 
or a rate-of-change adjustment. The early pages of this paper noted that, 
on average, prewar cyclical decelerations of aggregate demand were al- 
most twice as large and twice as frequent as in the postwar period. Often- 
repeated previous experience suggested to employers in the prewar period 
that cyclical expansions of demand and output would last a short time 
and would soon be reversed in a large way. Postwar experience gradually 
drove home the opposite lesson. This is not a case of expectations about 
wages and prices driving inflation. Rather, it is a question of expectations 
about the likely variability of demand and output: to what extent, with 
respect to  demand,  do  businessmen  and workers believe  the  maxim, 
"what goes up must shortly come down"? 
Acceleration and Changes in the Norm 
There is a wide range of evidence that can be marshaled to indicate 
that inflation is not easily  subject to  accelerationist propensities of  an 
adaptive kind. Over a wide intermediate range a change in inflation gen- 
erated by a change in labor market tightness may occur without generat- 
ing the continuing disappointments or serendipity that keeps expectations 
changing and inflation accelerating  (or  decelerating).  Cyclical  expan- 
sions in output and employment, for example, have not typically been 
kept going by an upward movement along labor supply curves. Expan- 
sions were not characterized by a continued acceleration in inflation as 
unemployment was held below  the natural rate and price expectations 
were adjusted with a lag to actual experience. 
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does inflation typically grow faster as expansion proceeds and unemploy- 
ment stays at low levels, and does inflation typically continue to decline 
after a trough has been reached while unemployment and the GNP gap 
are still presumably above their "natural"  levels? 
A  simple count was made to determine the extent to which inflation 
increased in each successive year of peacetime expansion (through 1964): 
Number  of cases 
Year of  Number of  in which inflation 
expansion  expansions  increased 
1  12  9 
2  11  6 
3  6  2 
4  3  1 
Thus in nine out of  twelve  peacetime  cycles  inflation rose  during the 
first year of expansion. There were eleven cycles that lasted two years or 
more; in only five of those cycles did inflation continue to rise. In the third 
year of the six expansions that lasted three years or more inflation in- 
creased in only two cases.3  There was, in other words, no tendency for 
inflation to accelerate in the later years of cycle expansions. 
Table 9 presents the same basic data in another form so  that price 
behavior in each expansion can easily be contrasted with the behavior of 
unemployment. (The table excludes depression years.) The early years of 
a recovery were as likely as the later years to have a relatively large in- 
crease in inflation. In peacetime expansions before  1966  there was no 
tendency for inflation to  accelerate as unemployment and the gap be- 
tween actual and potential GNP narrowed. 
On the other hand, in the prewar period not one  of  the expansions 
lasted past the third year. In the 1905-07  expansion, inflation did move 
up relatively strongly as the unemployment rate and the gap fell to un- 
usually low levels. But the severe recession following the panic of  1907 
nipped this in the bud-nonf  arm GNP in real terms fell by more than 10 
percent and in nominal terms by 1  1 percent in 1908. In the longer expan- 
sion of  1950-53,  unemployment and the gap were pushed to very low 
levels.  But inflation decelerated in the last  two years of  the boom.  A 
number of very special elements characterized this period (including the 
collapse of a wildly misplaced inventory speculation in 1950 and the im- 
37.  Inflation was measured by the nonfarm deflator. Differences in the inflation 
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Table 9. Behavior  of Inflation  and  Unemployment  during  Peacetime 
Expansions,  1901-69 
Percent 
Deviationi of  Perry weighted 
inflation from  the norma  unemploymenit  rate 
Year of expanisioni  Year of expanisioni 
Year or period  First  Second  Thlird  Fourth  First  Second  Thlird  Fourth 
First year of expansion 
1901  -4.4  0.9  0.9  ...  5.0  4.3  4.5  ... 
1905  1.5  1.2  1.7  ...  4.9  1.7  3.0 
1909  0.2  1.4  ...  ...  5.6  6.4  ...  ... 
1912  2.5  -1.3  ...  ...  4.9  4.5  ...  ... 
1925  0.8  -1.5  ...  ...  3.0  1.5  ...  ... 
1928  0.6  0.2  ...  ...  3.1  4.0  3.0 
1950  -0.7  4.1  -0.5  -0.3  4.4  2.5  2.3  2.3 
1955  -0.4  0.8  1.0  ...  3.6  3.3  3.5  ... 
1961  -0.8  0.1  -0.2  -0.2  5.6  4.5  4.4  3.9 
Additional  yearsb 
1965  0.1  3.2 
1966  1.3  2.6 
1967  1.7  2.7 
1968  2.5  2.4 
1969  3.3  2.3 
Source: Same as table 8. 
a.  Inflation is measured as changes in the private nonfarm GNP deflator. 
b.  Deviation measured  from a constant 1.2 percent inflation norm in all years. 
plementation of wage and price controls in  1951).  It has usually been 
treated as a special case.38 
The 1961-69  expansion stands out starkly. It is more than double the 
length of  any previous expansion, and during its latter half unemploy- 
ment was consistently held at exceedingly low levels, well below the level 
at which Keynesian unemployment was exhausted. After 1965, inflation 
accelerated steadily.  And  the  acceleration  was  not  associated  with  a 
38. See John Lewis, "The  Lull that Came to Stay,"  Journal  of Political Economy, 
vol. 63 (February 1955),  pp. 1-19; Bert G. Hickman, "The Korean War and the 
United States Economic Activity," Occasional Paper 49  (National Bureau of Eco- 
nomic Research, 1955);  and Perry, "Changing Labor Markets and Inflations," 
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speedup in the rate of change in aggregate demand. In 1960-64,  80 per- 
cent of the expansion of nominal GNP found its way into higher output 
and 20 percent into higher prices. In  1965-69  the ratio dropped to 60 
and 40 percent, respectively. 
From table 9, therefore, one can infer that inflation has consistently 
been  quite resistant to  accelerationist tendencies  or norm  shifts,  even 
when unemployment and the GNP were pushed to fairly low levels, so 
long as those levels were not maintained over a substantial length of time. 
At the same time, the 1966-69  experience strongly suggests that mainte- 
nance of high demand pressures and inflation rates well above the norm 
for a sustained period does set in motion acceleration or norm shifting. 
This period and its norm shift are discussed further below. 
Table 9 is based on annual data and conceivably could give misleading 
signals about the acceleration or deceleration of  inflation near cyclical 
turning points. An examination of monthly CPI and WPI data can help 
resolve this problem. 
If all the world were a wheat pit, with markets characterized by flex- 
prices that cleared immediately in response to disturbances, and if move- 
ments in nominal demand were unpredicted by traders, then except for 
supply shocks, inflation would rise or fall as nominal GNP accelerated or 
decelerated. But most markets do not instantaneously clear, and serially 
correlated movements in output and employment regularly occur. Each 
of the various models of the inflationary process implies a different cycli- 
cal timing for the inflation that results. 
Accelerationist  models-with  adaptive  expectations  and  relatively 
short lags in the expectations function-require  that prices continue to 
accelerate (decelerate)  so long  as the actual rate of unemployment or 
the GNP gap is below (above)  its natural rate. As long as the cycle trough 
is low enough to keep unemployment above the natural rate well into the 
recovery, inflation should continue to decelerate after the trough. (If prices 
were falling during the contractions they would not begin to rise again 
immediately after the trough.) The mirror image holds for a rise in infla- 
tion at the cycle peak. Phillips curve models should have inflation mov- 
ing simultaneously with the cycle, rising and falling with the level of un- 
employment or the GNP gap. In the modified Keynesian model presented 
earlier, the deviation of inflation from its "norm" should move with the 
rate of change of GNP; cyclical timing of peaks and troughs in inflation 
should depend on the specific course of nominal GNP during the cycle. Charles L. Schultze  559 
Because none of the models is "pure" and flexprices do account for some 
fraction of overall price movements, especially in the WPI, one cannot 
sort out inflation theories simply on the basis of cyclical timing. But an 
examination of  the  cyclical  behavior  of  monthly wholesale  and retail 
prices can provide some help in determining the presence or lack of ac- 
celerationist tendencies. 
Table 10 shows the timing of peaks and troughs in the level and rate 
of change in wholesale industrial prices and the rate of change of con- 
sumer prices relative to  the peaks  and troughs of  peacetime  business 
cycles through 1966.39  The data shown are centered six-month moving 
averages to smooth erratic monthly fluctuations. 
With a few exceptions, mainly in the 1920s when there was a down- 
trend in wholesale prices, the level of wholesale prices reached peaks and 
troughs roughly coincident with peaks and troughs in the level  of eco- 
nomic activity. Both wholesale and consumer price inflation rates tended 
to reach peaks and troughs well before cycle peaks and troughs. On both 
counts this behavior is at least roughly consistent with the rate-of-change 
formulation set forth earlier in this paper. Generally, but not universally, 
the periods of greatest accelerations and decelerations of  aggregate de- 
mand precede cycle peaks and troughs. The timing of price behavior is 
clearly inconsistent with an accelerationist model. 
While the foregoing cyclical analysis suggests that an absence of  ac- 
celerationist tendencies over the range of movements in  aggregate de- 
mand characterized peacetime  cycles  up  through the  mid-1 960s,  how 
about the econometric evidence from the coefficients on the lagged de- 
pendent variable in table 8? The coefficient on p-,  which was quite low 
in the periods before  1954,  suddenly jumped to  0.66  in  1954-66.  A 
longer-term (four-year)  Almon  lag on the dependent variable shows a 
sum of  coefficients approaching  1.0  for  that period.  Gordon's  recent 
papers display a similar pattern-a  low or nonexistent value for the pre- 
war years and a (long-lagged)  sum of coefficients approaching 1 begin- 
ning in the 1950s. 
Does this provide evidence that experience with employment-support- 
ing demand policy in the postwar period created an environment in which 
expected inflation, or the norm, began to adjust continuously to actual 
inflation experience? I think the answer is no. 
39. Because the level of  CPI often did not fall during a contraction, only the 
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Table 10.  Timing of Cyclical Movements in the Wholesale Price Index and 
Consumer Price Index, Selected Years,  1900-61a 
Number of months 
Months preceding (+)  or trailing (-) 
businiess  cycle peaks or troughs 
Consumer 
Wholesale price index  price index 
Rate of  Rate of 
Year anid  measure  Level  chanige  change 
Cycle troughs 
1900  -  1  +  4  ... 
1904  -  1  +15 
1908  +  2  +  7  ... 
1912  +  1  +16  ... 
1914  -  1  +19  ... 
1921  -  7  +  6  +  4 
1924  -  2  +11  +  3 
1927  -  3  +  9  +  1 
1933  -  0  +23  +12 
1938  -12  +  5  +  5 
1949  0  +  6  +  8 
1954  0  +  5  +  1 
1958  -  1  0  +  6 
1961b  .  .  .  +  6  +  1 
Cycle peaks 
1902  -4  +1  ... 
1907  0  +  6  ... 
1910  -  4  +  7  ... 
1913  -  2  +10  ... 
1923  +  1  +10  0 
1926  +12  +22  +13 
1929  +  9  +13  0 
1937  -  2  +  3  +45 
1948c  0  +12  ... 
1953d  -  3  +  2 
1957  -3  +22  +3 
1960  +  2  +18  +  8 
Sources: Same as table 5. 
a.  Data are centered six-month moving averages. A plus (+)  sign indicates that the price peak or trough 
came earlier than the business cycle peak or trough by the number of months shown for the year. 
b.  From 1959 through 1963 the six-month average of the wholesale price index moved within the nar- 
row range of 94.6 to 95.6. 
c.  Peak CPI change occurred in September 1946 (+26)  but several lesser peaks followed. 
d. Peak CPI change occurred in March 1951 (+29),  but several lesser peaks followed. Charles  L. Schultze  561 
As was noted above, the variance of inflation in  1954-66  was quite 
small compared to preceding and subsequent periods, as was the variance 
in nominal aggregate demand, unemployment, and output. The average 
level of inflation from 1961 through 1966, however, was modestly lower 
than it was in  1954-60,  and this could  not  be  explained  by a higher 
average level of unemployment or a pattern of changes in unemployment. 
Anything that explains the fact of that lower average will  account for 
much of the variance in inflation during this period. This paper has mod- 
eled the phenomenon as a norm shift (a shift from a 2.5 percent norm to a 
1.5 percent norm, occurring in 1961), most probably resulting from the 
experience of two back-to-back recessions separated only by an aborted 
recovery. It is this phenomenon that is picked up by the coefficient on the 
lagged dependent variable. Thus if the dependent variable is defined as 
lt  =  (Pt  -  PN),  and  the  equation  for  1954-66  refit,  the  coefficient  on 
nlt-i  drops to a range of 0.14 to 0.36  (depending on whether the norm is 
shifted in 1961 or 1960 with R2 of 0.72 and 0.77, respectively). 
Such a test does not itself establish the superiority of the "sticky" norm 
model over a continuous adjustment approach. Indeed, it hinges on the 
presupposition that the norm did in fact change because of economic con- 
ditions. But what it does show is that the high value of the coefficient on 
the lagged dependent variable results from a very specific phenomenon: 
the average level of inflation in the second half of the period was lower 
than in the first half, and this could not be explained by the disequilibrium 
variables in the equation  (1/URW  and AURW).  This phenomenon is 
clearly not evidence for an adaptive expectations, natural rate model or 
for a postwar shift toward accelerationist propensities brought about by 
employment-supporting aggregate demand policy. 
Based on evidence of various kinds, therefore, the behavior of inflation 
in peacetime cycles  suggests that economic  agents do  not  respond  as 
accelerationist theory requires: persistent movements in output and em- 
ployment during periods that characterized most of business-cycle history 
since 1900 cannot be linked to persistent accelerations or decelerations in 
inflation. T he greater part of these cyclical movements did not take place 
along or in the neighborhood of labor supply curves, requiring continual 
and self-defeating efforts to change real wages, relative wages, or both. 
And, in the formulation set forth in this paper, significant changes in the 
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Table 11. Price and Wage  Flexibility  in Major  Wars  and  Their  Aftermath 
Percent  change  per year or ratio 
Nominal  GNP  Whlolesale  Economy- 
GNPa  deflatora  Ratios  price  wide 
Period  (y)  (p)  p/y  or Ap/Ay  index  wagesb 
World  War I 
1915-20  18.0  15.6  0.87  17.4  16.7 
1920-22  -10.0  -13.0  1.30  -20.9  -4.4 
Deceleration  (A) -28.0  -28.6  1.02  -38.  3  -21.1 
1915-22  9.2  6.6  ...  4.9  10.3 
World  War II 
1941-48  11.0  7.8  0.71  9.1  11.0 
1948-49  -0.5  -1.0  2.00  -5.0  3.3 
Deceleration  (A) -11.  5  -8.8  0.77  -14.1  -7.7 
1941-49  9.5  6.7  ...  7.2  10.3 
Sources: GNP series-same  as table 1; wholesale price index-Bureau  of Labor Statistics; wage series- 
same as table 6. 
a.  Total GNP. Use of private nonfarm GNP makes little difference; the private nonfarm deceleration 
ratio in World War I is 1.02 instead of  1.03 and in World War II, 0.65 instead of 0.77. 
b.  Lebergott series as described in table 6. 
War and Postwar Adjustments 
It was pointed out above that during both world wars and the reces- 
sions that immediately followed (1921  and 1949)  inflation behaved quite 
differently relative to changes in aggregate demand than it did during the 
peacetime  cycles.  Just how  different this behavior was  is  set  forth in 
table 11. 
Although  there were  some  sharp differences in  economic  develop- 
ments and economic  policy, the two periods shared a number of  com- 
mon characteristics. In both periods the wartime boom was followed im- 
mediately by a noncyclical drop in output (1946  and 1919-20),  as war 
plants were converted to peacetime uses. Inflation continued, and indeed 
accelerated, during these reconversion periods. The subsequent booms 
ended in recessions-very  steep in 1921, mild in 1949. 
During both these periods price increases absorbed a large part of the 
huge rise in nominal GNP. This is not surprising because in both periods 
unemployment and the GNP gap were reduced to very low disequilibrium 
levels. (For example, the Perry weighted unemployment rate fell to 1-1/2 
percent in  1918  and in  1943-45.)  While Phillips curve reactions were 
weak in  the range of  unemployment and the gap that typically char- Charles  L. Schultze  563 
acterized peacetime cycles, they became powerful in the conditions that 
dominated both war periods. The  earlier supply curve equation, from 
which  a  relatively  small  "X" was  derived,  is  not  valid  under  these 
conditions. 
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that the deceleration coefficients, 
(Ap/zAy), were so large in the subsequent recessions. Prices absorbed all, 
or more than all, of the recession declines in nominal GNP. Wages also 
decelerated very rapidly in both postwar recessions.40 
The rapid and unusual fall in inflation in the recessions immediately 
following the two wars is, I think, instructive. It is, on the one hand, con- 
sistent with a rational expectations view of the world. Precisely because 
both wars were, and more importantly, were seen to be, unique events, 
neither the inflation they generated nor the monetary policies that accom- 
panied them were extrapolated into the future. The first sign of  major 
weakness in economic  activity led  to  a collapse  of  price expectations. 
Alternatively,  the  wartime evidence  can  also  support  an  Okun-Perry 
nonaccelerationist model. Again, because the wartime developments were 
seen as unique events, they did not give rise to a major increase in the 
inflation norm. Firms did continue to bid up wages rapidly and com- 
petitively during the war in an attempt to hire more workers in a labor 
market where  Keynesian  unemployment  had  completely  disappeared. 
And even though labor markets eased somewhat when the war ended, 
they remained relatively tight into the immediate postwar boom. But the 
very high inflation rates did not get built into the "norm" that underlay 
implicit wage contracts. Sharp reductions in the rate of wage increases in 
the recessions of  1921  and  1949  did  not  violate  those  implicit  wage 
contracts. 
The Past Fifteen Years 
Conflicting interpretations of  the  transition from the  felicitous  and 
apparently stable trade-off of the  1960s  to  a decade of  simultaneously 
higher inflation and unemployment have been debated on a number of 
occasions in the pages of Brookings Papers. On the most recent occasion 
the discussion was focused on George Perry's 1980 inflation article and 
40.  It is interesting  that real wages rose sharply over both wartime cycles taken 
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the competing equations and interpretations of Robert Gordon. I do not 
attempt to provide an alternative econometric solution here to the puzzle 
of the transition. In this section, however, major events are reviewed that 
had an impact on inflation during the period since 1965, and contrasts are 
made with the previous history of inflation in the United States. The con- 
clusion is that the worsened inflation and unemployment of recent years 
did not result from a series of policy mistakes and exogenous shocks im- 
pinging on an economic  structure that is fundamentally accelerationist 
and inflation prone. Rather, a historically unparalleled series of inflation- 
ary events, including economic policy "mistakes," impinged on an eco- 
nomic  structure that was  relatively inflation-resistant. These  develop- 
ments were so large as to raise sharply, in several episodes, what had 
hitherto been  a small and rather sticky norm. Quite possibly,  but not 
certainly, a decade of relatively high inflation may have also changed the 
ease with which actual inflation now gets translated into a new norm. 
Most researchers treat the turn of the decade and the failure of infla- 
tion to slow during the 1970-71  recession as the beginning of the transi- 
tion. In fact, however, it was the last half of the 1960s that broke with the 
past (in  terms of  events, not economic  structure).  I noted earlier how 
unique the expansion of the 1960s was. By mid-1965  the expansion was 
already longer than any other in twentieth century history. The expansion 
was then extended yet another four years. As shown in table 9, the Perry 
weighted unemployment rate was pushed to low levels not experienced 
since the Korean War and held there for four consecutive years.4"  Devia- 
tions of inflation from a very modest norm, which had been remarkably 
small during the first five years of the expansion, began to grow larger 
each year in the last half of the expansion. 
Throughout this paper I have stressed evidence that large shifts in the 
norm do not occur easily. But the norm is clearly not immune to large 
and persistent deviations of actual inflation from it. Unlike the situation 
in the First and Second World Wars, every effort was made in the late 
1960s  to convince the country that a peacetime economic  situation ex- 
isted. There was no tax increase until very late in the game; there were no 
controls or rationing, no mobilization of the reserves or of industry, and 
the  country simultaneously embarked on  the  ambitious creation of  a 
41.  Moreover, the labor market tightness represented  by a given level of Perry 
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Table 12. Illustrative  Measures  of Pressure  for Norm Shifting, 
Selected  Periods,  1900-69a 
Percentage  points 
Deviation  of inflation  from the norm  Change  in GNP less 
change  in potential 
Multiplied  by  during  subsequent 
Period  Additive  duration  contraction 
1900-03  -3  (2)b  _3  (3)b  -6 
1904-07  4  8  -14 
1908-10  2  2  0 
1911-13  1  1  -10 
1924-26  -1  -1  -4 
1927-29  1  1  -45 
1949-53  3  2  -  5 
1954-57  1  2  -5 
196069c  9  19  -4 
Source: Same as table 1. 
a.  Based on private nonfarm GNP. See text for an explanation of the series. 
b.  In 1901, the first year of expansion, the deviation of inflation from the norm was -4.4  percent. The 
numbers in parentheses give the results when that year is excluded from the calculations. 
c.  Deviations were mainly small negative values through 1964. The calculations shown in the first and 
second columns begin with 1965 as the first year. 
"Great Society." As inflation began to rise, there was no effort to blame it 
on an abnormal wartime situation or to take wartime steps to deal with it. 
The persistence of wage and price norms-or,  if you will, the lack of 
accelerationist  tendencies-over  the  range  of  experience  in  previous 
peacetime cycles suggests that the learning process by which old norms 
and rules of thumb are abandoned for new ones  depends on both the 
magnitude and the duration of the disequilibria that give rise to a devia- 
tion of actual inflation from the norm. Several crude indexes of the mag- 
nitude of  relative pressures leading  to  a norm  shift  are presented  in 
table 12. The quantification is not meant to suggest that there is some 
continuous function that can be discovered or that the forces making for 
a norm shift all arise out of  past inflation experience. Rather, it is  an 
attempt to convey how uniquely large the size and duration of the infla- 
tion deviations were during the late 1960s. 
The first column of the table simply sums the deviations of inflation 
from the then-existing norm during peacetime  cyclical  expansions.  By 
this measure of "norm shift pressure" the 1961-69  expansion generated 
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time expansion except one. And even that one,  1904-07,  generated de- 
viations only half as large. Moreover, the 1904-07  expansion was imme- 
diately followed  by  an  exceedingly  sharp decline  in  GNP  relative to 
potential (see the third column)  while the 1960-69  expansion was suc- 
ceeded by a small contraction. 
The second column attempts to take into account the persistence of 
disequilibria as  an important aspect of  a learning reinforcement pro- 
cess by which old norms are converted to new ones. To form the index 
for the second column each year's deviation of inflation from the norm 
was multiplied by the number of years that the deviation had persisted 
during the  cyclical  expansion,  and the  results were  summed.  Thus,  a 
deviation series 1, 1, 2 for three years of expansion would be converted 
to 1, 2, 4 and summed for an index of 7. Again, on this measure, 1961-69 
was highly unusual in terms of the pressures for norm change that were 
generated. Theory offers no warrant for the particular form of the index 
in the second column. But the concept of reinforcement, as a means by 
which the experience of  persistent disequilibria break through existing 
norms, does suggest the existence of an interaction between the magni- 
tude and the persistence of disequilibria and inflation deviations. 
Perry's 1980 equations suggest an upward shift of 4-1/2  percent in the 
wage norm for the 1970s as a whole. It is unlikely that there was a single 
one-time shift. The decade of the 1970s not only opened as the norm was 
shifting upward; it  witnessed  several other events  of  sufficiently large 
magnitude to have led, in all probability, to additional norm shifts. Table 
13 provides several relevant measures of the magnitude of supply shocks 
from the farm and energy sectors. The effect of energy price rises on the 
chain-weighted price index for personal consumption expenditure, shown 
in the final column of  table  13, takes into  account both the  effect on 
energy products bought  directly by  consumers  and the  indirect effect 
through energy cost increases paid by business firms and passed on to 
consumers in the prices of nonenergy products. (See  appendix A  for a 
summary of how this measure was constructed.) 
If the norm is resistant to quick changes, the normal procyclical fluc- 
tuations in farm prices such as those that occurred in the prewar period 
should not affect it. Only once before during the period since  1900 did 
a sharp rise in real farm prices suggest the existence of a major supply 
shock. That happened in the  1908-10  expansion and was immediately 
followed by a sharp drop in real farm prices in 1911. The 1972-73  rise Charles L. Schultze  567 
Table 13. Measures  of Farm  and Energy  Price Shocks,  Selected  Years, 1973-80a 
Percentage  points 
Effects  on chain-weighted  price index 
Direct effects on GNP deflator  of personal  consumption  expenditure 
Year  Total  Farm  Enzergy  Total  Food  Energy 
1973  1.3  1.3  b  2.4  2.0  0.5 
1974  0.3  -0.5  0.8  3.9  1.5  2.4 
1975  0.0  -0.4  0.4  1.1  0.2  0.9 
1978  0.3  0.3  b  0.8  0.7  0.1 
1979  0.7  0.2  0.5  2.8  0.8  2.1 
1980  0.7  -0.4  1.1  3.3  0.2  3.2 
Source: Calculations by the author based on national income and product accounts. 
a.  The direct effects of farm prices on the GNP deflator are measured as the contribution of changes in 
the farm sector deflator to the overall GNP deflator. The direct energy effect on the GNP deflator is calcu- 
lated from changes in the average price of domestically produced oil, natural gas, and coal. Assuming a 
dollar-and-cents  pass-through, three-fourths  of the contribution is entered in the year of occurrence  and the 
remainder  in the subsequent year. The direct impact of food and energy prices on the personal consumption 
expenditure deflator is the sum of  the increase in consumer food  and energy prices multiplied by their 
relative  importance in the fixed weight deflator plus an estimate of the increased  cost of energy incorporated 
in other consumer goods.The pass-through  of indirect  effects is accomplished in two stages; two-thirds  in the 
year of occurrence, one-third in subsequent years. 
b.  Not calculated. 
in real food prices, however, was not fully reversed in immediately sub- 
sequent years. 
Before  1973 there is no evidence of any upward shift in real energy 
prices. Furthermore, an admittedly brief review of  wholesale  price in- 
dexes does not suggest the previous existence of supply shocks in other 
industries at all comparable to the oil  shocks of  1974  and  1979-80.42 
The 1970s are highly unique in the magnitude of the supply shocks that 
occurred. Given  an aggregate demand policy  that,  over  time,  at least 
accommodated the direct impact of the shocks, the economy had to ab- 
sorb a total increase of almost 14 percent in the price level in a relatively 
short period of time, and this estimate does not allow for any increase in 
the norm arising from the supply shocks. 
In addition to supply shocks from food and energy, the economy also 
had to  adjust to  a major slowdown  in productivity growth.43 If,  as is 
42. A more thorough review of the data and the literature is undoubtedly  war- 
ranted.  The decline in real raw materials prices from 1955  to 1964 may, for exam- 
ple, have contributed  to the modest shift downward in the norm that apparently 
occurred  between the 1950s and 1960s. 
43. While it is possible that part of the productivity  slowdown was itself due to 
the higher and more variable inflation, the consequences  remained the same as if it 
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generally agreed, most prices tend to be set in relation to standard unit 
labor costs, a perceived one-time reduction in the productivity level will 
lead to an increase in the level of the aggregate supply curve unless the 
level of the nominal wage norm is shifted downward. The same conclu- 
sion, in first-difference  form, is applicable to a perceived slowdown in the 
productivity growth rate. But there is no reason to posit a downward shift 
in the nominal wage norm in response to  a productivity decline if the 
price-raising effects of that decline are accommodated by a rise in nomi- 
nal aggregate demand. If the typical sectoral supply shock can be kept 
from affecting the norm, its effect on inflation will be temporary. But a 
long-term slowdown in productivity growth, even if kept out of the norm, 
will raise the rate of price inflation permanently; and if some of the in- 
creased inflation gets into the norm, the effect will be still larger. 
There is disagreement among analysts about the precise timing of the 
decline in the growth trend of productivity. In the last three years, how- 
ever, productivity growth in the private nonfarm economy has been virtu- 
ally zero. If,  on the strength of  recent experience, businessmen in the 
aggregate are now pricing on the basis of a zero to 1 percent a year pro- 
ductivity gain, the loss of productivity growth over the past decade has 
amounted to an increase of about  1-1/2  to 2 percentage points in the 
annual inflation embedded in the aggregate supply curve. 
A final, and very tentatively suggested, source of upward pressure on 
the aggregate supply curve in the past decade may have been the behavior 
of union wages. While a number of authors have noted that during the 
1960s union wages tended to rise less than nonunion wages,44  the reversal 
of the process in the 1970s has far more than made up for it. The average 
annual effective increase in wages in union contract settlements involving 
more than 1,000 workers was 8.4 percent in the 1970s versus an adjusted 
wage increase of 7.6 percent for all workers. The relative gains of a small 
number of large unions in industries that are concentrated, regulated, or 
benefiting from  high  energy  prices  have  been  even  greater. Average 
straight-time hourly earnings in nine major industries (steel, automobile, 
aluminum, canning, trucking, rail, petroleum refining, coal mining, and 
communications)  rose from 19 percent above the average for all manu- 
facturing in 1967 to 42 percent above it in 1980. 
44.  Perry, "Inflation  in Theory and Practice";  and George E. Johnson, "Changes 
over Time in the Union/Nonunion Wage Differential  in the United States" (Univer- 
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Daniel Mitchell has presented evidence that union wages tend to rise 
more slowly than nonunion wages in periods of tight labor markets and 
faster in weak markets.45  It is surely true that unions with good cost-of- 
living clauses did better than average in protecting real wages  against 
surprise supply shocks. It also appears that many unions in subsequent 
negotiations were able to preserve these relative gains. More generally, 
the Mitchell findings may tentatively be  expanded. Unions  exert their 
bargaining power to claim a larger share of the bilateral surplus in career 
labor markets principally in ways designed to protect the real wages of 
their members during unfavorable demand and supply circumstances of 
two kinds: reduced demand for labor and a speedup in inflation not gener- 
ally accompanied by increased demand for labor  (such as autonomous 
supply shocks).46  To the extent that the hypothesis is correct, it would 
explain the virtually continuous widening of the gap between union and 
nonunion wages during the 1970s. 
The literature gives no  settled answer about the extent to which an 
autonomous rise in union wages influences wage patterns elsewhere. But 
such increases did raise the supply curve in the affected industries and 
therefore had at least some effect on the aggregate supply curve. 
In sum, having just emerged from  an unprecedented boom  and an 
upward shift in the inflation norm at the end of the 1960s, the economy 
was faced in the last seven years of the 1970s with three developments 
that pushed up its aggregate supply curve. Food and energy supply shocks 
required a 14 percent upward adjustment in the level of the supply curve 
for consumer goods. Slowed productivity growth led to a significant up- 
ward adjustment  in the rate of inflation embedded in the aggregate supply 
curve, and a substantial exogenous upward shift occurred in the aggregate 
supply curve in a number of major unionized industries. 
Given the unprecedented magnitude of  the shocks  to  the  aggregate 
supply curve, largely accommodated over the period as a whole by the 
growth in nominal demand, the resulting price increases were very large 
and undoubtedly sufficient to induce a substantial further upward shift in 
the norm during the 1970s. 
In addition to these "real" pressures that tended to produce upward 
45.  Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Union Wage Determination: Policy Implications and 
Outlook," BPEA,  3:1978,  pp. 537-9  1. 
46.  See James E. Annable, Jr., "Wage  Norms and Interindustry  Structure"  (Uni- 
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norm shifts, there may have been a problem of misperceptions. Princi- 
pally because of the interaction between the way its housing component 
is calculated and the recent history of mortgage interest rates and home 
prices, the CPI in  1977-80  rose by 5-1/2  percent more than the fixed 
weight deflator for personal consumption expenditure. To the extent that 
the 1979-80  price acceleration in the CPI came as a surprise, the exis- 
tence of CPI-based cost-of-living clauses in union contracts and the prac- 
tice by some nonunion firms of matching relevant union wage changes got 
some of the "excess" CPI inflation into nominal wage increases, which in 
turn added their contribution to the upward pressures on the norm. 
To summarize, the three sets of inflationary shocks that occurred dur- 
ing the past twelve to fifteen years exceeded by a huge margin any shocks 
in previous peacetime experience; and they came after an unprecedented 
period of expansion had already shifted up wage norms. Although wage 
and price setting in the American economy  appears to have had very 
stable characteristics in peacetime cycles and was quite resistant to cumu- 
lative effects from demand-supply disequilibria and actual inflation ex- 
perience, that stability was overwhelmed beginning in 1966 by events of 
historically unique magnitude. 
Summary of Findings 
This paper has identified a number of characteristics of  the cyclical 
behavior of wages and prices in response to changes in aggregate demand. 
Some  of  these  characteristics provide  evidence  that is  relevant to  an 
evaluation of competing theories about the economy's aggregate supply 
curve. 
First, the cyclical sensitivity of the nonfarm deflator to changes in aggre- 
gate demand has been quite small in both prewar and postwar peacetime 
cycles. The weak responsiveness of price change to change in aggregate 
demand is the inverse of a large elasticity of output to aggregate demand 
change. The data for the nonfarm GNP suggest an observed elasticity of 
supply  (output  change relative to price change)  of  around 5.  Such a 
high observed elasticity of supply cannot be reconciled with theories that 
explain cyclical inflation on the basis of market-clearing behavior includ- 
ing misperceptions and predict that adoption of a credible noninflationary 
macro policy  would yield  much larger price and much smaller output 
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Second, not only was the cyclical sensitivity of the nonfarm deflator 
weak, it did not change between the prewar and the postwar years, at least 
up until the late 1  960s. The cyclical sensitivity of wages did decline some- 
what, but was never large to begin with. The relative constancy of price 
and wage flexibility over periods of quite different monetary policy re- 
gimes suggests that, contrary to rational expectations doctrine, the small 
size of the flexibility coefficient is itself  structural, and not  a spurious 
relation  arising from  the  inflationary effect  on  price  expectations  of 
employment-supporting monetary policy in the postwar period. 
Third, wholesale  price flexibility did decline  substantially from pre- 
war to postwar years. Some of  the decline  may have been  a statistical 
mirage, but not all of it. One hypothesis, suggested but not explored in 
this paper, is the spread of customer markets from the retail sphere to the 
wholesale sphere as a concomitant of the broader development of national 
markets for consumer goods. 
Fourth, the lack of a systematic procyclical component to real product 
wages (nonfarm wages divided by the nonfarm deflator) implies that an 
explanation of cyclical movement in inflation cannot be explained by a 
combination of movements along aggregate labor supply curves and ex- 
pectational  or  informational phenomena  as  posited  by  accelerationist 
theories of the business cycle. 
On the one hand, the failure of  real wages  (measured in consumer 
product prices) to rise and fall procyclically strongly indicates that cycli- 
cal expansions and contractions of output do not principally represent 
market-clearing movements up  and down the economy's  labor supply 
curve. On the other hand, the cyclical pattern and timing of annual and 
monthly price movements also indicate that economic expansions are not 
typically driven, as accelerationist theory would seem to call for, by con- 
tinuing misperceptions  or  information  lags  and  by  the  self-defeating 
efforts to raise real or relative wages that lead to acceleration of inflation. 
The cyclical history suggests, therefore, that over a wide range of its 
cyclical experience much of  the fluctuation in output and employment 
was neither a movement along an aggregate labor supply curve nor the 
result of an accelerationist process of misperceptions about the relative 
prices (or wages)  on which those curves are based. 
Fifth, throughout prewar and postwar peacetime cycles, at least until 
1966, the rate of change in aggregate demand variables played an impor- 
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level of aggregate demand (relative to potential)  was not a determinant 
of inflation; in the postwar years, however, the level of demand became 
a significant factor. A  speed-limit model  can account for the "rate-of- 
change" phenomenon. Even during periods of Keynesian unemployment, 
expanding firms raise the level of wages relative to the prevailing norm 
in order to speed the flow of new recruits, and these increases are at least 
partially imitated by other firms. 
But in the postwar period an employment-supporting policy of demand 
management led to expectations about demand and output that converted 
part of the one-time rise in the wage level-which  accompanied an in- 
crease in demand relative to potential-into  a continuing inflation. Such 
a change in behavior is consistent with a predictive or "rational" element 
in the formation of expectations about aggregate demand, even though 
economic  agents do  not  translate that  prediction  about  demand  into 
money-neutral price expectations. 
Sixth, the  range in which  the  aggregate supply curve exhibits non- 
accelerationist behavior is by no means unlimited. Persistent operation of 
the economy at low levels of unemployment or a persistent excess of ac- 
tual inflation over the prevailing norm (or if one insists, relative to longer- 
term price expectations)  will set in motion accelerationist pressures. And 
relatively long periods in which inflation runs below the norm can result 
in a downward shift in the norm, as appears to have happened in the 
early 1960s. The complex of forward- and backward-looking forces that 
influence the setting of  current wages  and prices shows  a good  bit  of 
inertia. Because the cyclical evidence suggests that actual prices in expan- 
sions and contractions do not typically behave as if these forces changed 
gradually and systematically in response to moderate cyclical swings in 
inflation, the use of a sticky but not immutable norm to approximate their 
behavior seems reasonable. 
Concluding Comments 
The difficulty of modeling the upward norm shifts that have character- 
ized the recent past leaves wide room for agnosticism about the chief 
policy issue of the time. The evidence is, I believe, fairly convincing that 
the norm will not be shifted significantly (or long-term price expectations 
reduced), even by several years of moderate negative deviations of actual Charles L. Schultze  573 
inflation from the norm-which  themselves are costly in terms of  lost 
output and employment. Although  credible evidence  that demand re- 
straint will be pursued should  affect expectations  about the course  of 
nominal demand, the response of prices to such expected changes in de- 
mand will still be modest. 
There is no  warrant, however,  for  attributing norm shifts solely  to 
actual or expected changes in demand variables. Perry and others have 
showed, I think convincingly, that the explosion of wages that occurred 
in Europe at the end of the 1960s could not be attributed to changes in 
demand, demand management policies,  or supply shocks.47 Moreover, 
it is difficult to attribute the sharp rise in union wages in 1970 and 1971 
in the United States solely to the standard variables. 
In a climate in which actual and expected demand conditions are favor- 
able to inflation reduction, the relatively steady trend of wages around 
which fluctuations in inflation take place may be influenced by a wide 
range of  events whose  effects on the norm can at least be  speculated. 
Two major and highly visible union contracts come up for renewal in 
1982 in industries that are already in trouble and whose wages are by 
almost any standard "out of line"-automobiles48  and trucking. As  this 
paper is written, adamant opposition to an out-of-line wage increase for 
the air traffic controllers, taken at some substantial risk, appears to have 
been successful. Barring further government sweetening of the trigger- 
price mechanism, a continuing strong dollar would  yield  a  1983  steel 
bargaining climate in which the chance for wage moderation will be un- 
usually great. At further high risk, governmental failure to exert its usual 
intervention in the triennial railroad bargaining impasse next year-and 
perhaps governmental moral support for a major revision in work rules- 
might conceivably  yield  an  important anti-inflation settlement  in  this 
industry. Should the oil glut persist, and be expected to continue, condi- 
tions for norm moderation could also be strengthened. In short, a particu- 
lar concatenation of circumstances exists over the near-term future that 
47.  George L. Perry, "The Determinants  of Wage Inflation Around the World," 
BPEA, 2:1975, pp. 403-35; and David Soskice, "Shock  Waves and Wage Explosion, 
1968-1970:  An Economic Interpretation,"  in Colin Crouch and Alessandro Piz- 
zorno,  eds., The Resurgence  of  Class  Conflict  in Western Europe  Since  1968,  vol.  2: 
Comparative  Analyses (Holmes and Meier, 1978), pp. 221-46. 
48. In addition, Chrysler employees' wages and fringes in  1982 will be about 
20 percent below those at General Motors and Ford, and it is clearly impossible to 
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offers some speculative optimism for a moderate reduction in the wage 
norm to counter relative pessimism about the ease with which it can be 
moved by actual and expected demand restraint alone. 
APPENDIX  A 
Notes on the Data 
NOMINAL  GNP, real GNP, and the deflator for the total economy and the 
private nonfarm sector are based on the official U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis series from 1909  to  1980  (for  1909-28  see table I-23  in The 
National Income and Product Accounts of the United States 1929-1974, 
GPO,  1977).  Private nonfarm GNP equals total GNP minus farm and 
government components. It is a more inclusive measure than the often- 
used "private nonfarm business" concept, and it includes GNP arising in 
households and institutions and the rest of the world, as well as the im- 
puted rental services of owner-occupied dwellings. This more inclusive 
concept was chosen to maintain comparability in the series over time; the 
narrower-and  possibly more useful-version  is not available for years 
before 1929. 
For years preceding 1909 the Kendrick series for current and constant 
dollar GNP were used. (See columns A-1 and A-7, p. 166, in U.S. Bureau 
of the Census, Long Term Economic Growth, 1860-1965,  GPO, 1966.) 
A nonfarm GNP was constructed for 1900-09  by inflating the Kendrick 
constant dollar farm gross product (Long Term Economic Growth, col- 
umn A-21)  to current dollars by use of a Bureau of Agricultural Eco- 
nomics farm price series. (USDA  Technical Bulletin 703,  table 79; the 
index used is a Paasche price index.)  There is no estimate of current dol- 
lar government product in these years; the 1900-09  estimates represent 
movement in nonfarm GNP. But experimentation indicated that the fail- 
ure to exclude government had no significant effect on the results. 
Wholesale prices are from the U.S.  Bureau of  Labor Statistics. The 
total CPI and the CPI food index measures beginning in 1913  are also 
from BLS data. From  1900  to  1913  the CPI is from Albert Rees'  re- 
weighting of the Douglas data (see  Albert Rees, Real  Wages in Manu- Charles  L. Schultze  575 
facturing, 1890-1914  (Princeton University Press, 1961),  p.  74).  The 
Kendrick-BLS series  on  average hours worked  are from Long  Term 
Economic Growth, 1860-1970,  GPO, 1973, pp. 192-93  and from BLS. 
The wage series are discussed in the text. 
In table  13 an estimate is presented of the effect of energy price in- 
creases on the chain-weighted price index for personal consumption ex- 
penditure (PCE).  The estimate attempts to capture two effects of energy 
price increases: the effect on the overall index of price increases for energy 
products directly purchased by consumers, and the indirect effect on the 
index of the higher energy costs paid by industrial and commercial users 
and passed  on to  consumers in other product prices. The  measure of 
the indirect effect was based on work by Michael McKee, formerly of the 
Council of Economic Advisers' staff, who calculated that nonhousehold 
expenditures on petroleum products in 1979 were about equal to house- 
hold expenditures (0.98). It was assumed that the expenditure weights for 
petroleum product prices were the same for household and nonhousehold 
uses. Similar ratios of nonhousehold to household expenditures for natu- 
ral gas and electricity were constructed, using price and quantity data for 
commercial and industrial consumption of these products. It was further 
assumed that the  nonhousehold  uses  could  be  allocated  to  consumer 
goods by the following ratio-total  consumer expenditure less direct out- 
lays on energy divided by GNP less compensation of general government 
employees. The adjusted ratios were averaged, and the result was an over- 
all expenditure weight for indirect energy costs, as reflected in consumer 
product prices. A chain-weighted index for nonhousehold energy prices 
was constructed, using commercial and industrial price and quantity data 
for natural gas and electricity and letting the PCE price index for petro- 
leum products represent the price of nonhousehold petroleum products. 
Increases in the resulting price index for "indirect  uses" were entered two- 
thirds for the current and one-third for the subsequent year (to reflect an 
assumed lag in passing the increases through to final goods prices).  The 
weighted contribution of indirect energy price increases to the PCE chain- 
weighted price index was then calculated. 576  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
APPENDIX  B 
Is the Flexibility  of the Reduced  Wholesale 
Price  Index  a Statistical  Mirage? 
SEVERAL REASONS exist for believing that the reduced flexibility exhibited 
by the wholesale price index is not wholly a statistical mirage. 
First, the finished goods index shows roughly the same decline in flex- 
ibility as do the broader totals. The term "finished goods" is somewhat 
misleading because in earlier years the index included some intermediate 
goods. It also includes a few crude foods and other crude materials sold 
directly to final users. Nevertheless, the fact that the finished goods index 
exhibits the same characteristics as the other indexes must be given some 
weight. 
Second, Cagan calculated the frequency distribution of decelerations 
during cycle contractions for a group of forty-four individual series begin- 
ning in 1923.49 (The change in inflation rates for each series was measured 
from the period preceding the peak to the trough of cycle contractions, 
and a cumulative frequency distribution was plotted.)  With one exception 
(the 1948-49  contraction) the distribution shifts steadily toward smaller 
deceleration.50 
Third, the  calculation  of  flexibility coefficients for  three  individual 
industry groups-chemicals,  metals, and household  goods-from  1900 
to 1966 confirms for the latter two a sharp decline in flexibility. (Cyclical 
price changes in the chemical industry were probably overwhelmed by 
the effect of rapid technical progress in the prewar period.) 
This evidence is not conclusive. Even within individual subcomponents 
of the index, the number and importance of relatively homogenous flex- 
price  commodities  probably decreased.  Nevertheless,  it  seems  highly 
likely that wholesale prices became less flexible in the postwar period, not 
only absolutely but also in relation to changes in aggregate demand. 
49.  Phillip Cagan, "Changes  in the Recession Behavior of Wholesale Prices." 
50. This exceptional behavior of wholesale prices in the 1949 cycle is consistent 
with other evidence about wartime cycles discussed above. Comments  and 
Discussion 
William Fellner:  In my comments on Charles Schultze's paper and his 
interpretation of the data I offer an alternative interpretation in terms of 
what I consider the valid core of rationality hypotheses in the theory of 
expectations. As I see it, this valid core overlaps significantly with what 
in earlier writings I called the hypothesis of the credibility effect. That 
hypothesis places  emphasis on  the  effect of  a  consistent  and  credible 
policy posture on market expectations and thus on cost and price trends. 
Schultze's analysis of cost and price trends, on the other hand, gives 
great significance to the inertia of an inflation norm originating in the past 
experience of market participants. This inflation norm has characteristics 
of a rule of thumb or convention. Aside from factors that may be regarded 
as exogenous, the price level is viewed in the paper as dependent on the 
size of this inflation norm and on the level of "real" activity. The influence 
of the level of activity can be seen in the fact that keeping real activity 
supernormal  by the standards of an economy raises the price level, though 
it causes no acceleration as long as the inert inflation norm remains un- 
changed; and keeping the level  of activity subnormal reduces the price 
level, though it causes no deceleration as long as the inert inflation norm 
remains  unchanged. 
In arguing that until the experience of the  1960s  the inflation norm 
remained low and did not change much, the paper focuses on thirty-six 
years that, however, do not make up a continuum. These years start with 
a pre-World War I phase of the gold-standard era-the  period from 1900 
to 1913-then  continue with six years of the 1920s,  and finally include 
seventeen years of the period following World War II, namely the years 
from the late 1940s to the mid-1960s. According to the argument, the ex- 
ceptionally long expansion of the  1960s,  during which demand policy 
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kept activity levels well above normal for an extended period, led to in- 
flation far exceeding the norm originating in the preceding periods. Inert 
though the norm is, it has not proved to be so inert that it is unaffected 
by the cumulation of such a large discrepancy. That is, the events of the 
second half of the 1960s resulted in a significant increase in the inflation 
norm, which now shows the inertia it has always shown but at a signifi- 
cantly higher level. 
If one is determined to limit oneself to the years of the analysis in the 
paper, a limitation I do not  suggest, it may be difficult to distinguish sup- 
port for Schultze's inert inflation norm from support for the hypothesis 
I favor, which stresses the effect of a credible policy posture on expecta- 
tions. Yet  even if one limited the analysis to the years in the paper, I 
would still suggest that, other things equal, the hypothesis of intelligent 
foresight of credible policies deserves to be given preference over a hy- 
pothesis postulating a mechanistic adherence to rules of thumb. Even with 
a focus on the years to which Schultze's analysis primarily relates, it needs 
to be kept in mind that in the period from 1900 to the outbreak of World 
War I, markets must have been well aware of the likelihood that the new 
gold discoveries of the turn of the century would tilt the price trend mildly 
upward, following a period of a downward-tilted price trend that ended in 
1896.  And from the post-Korean period until the mid-1960s-another 
major part of Schultze's sample-the  markets had good reason to expect a 
tough demand policy guided mainly by the objective of price stability with 
a small margin for upward movement. For periods with these characteris- 
tics the effect of a credible policy posture may be hard to distinguish from 
what Schultze describes as the effect of a small and inert inflation norm. 
However, one of these two hypotheses has at least the advantage of credit- 
ing market participants with some degree of intelligence and perceptive- 
ness instead of  regarding them as following  blind rules of thumb, and 
crediting economists with the ability to figure these out. 
In the years following the mid-1960s  the markets must have realized 
that the monetary authorities became increasingly willing to accommo- 
date steepening rates of inflation that were considered necessary to achieve 
short-term employment policy goals, even if on various occasions full ac- 
commodation had to be temporarily discontinued to prevent the process 
from getting out of hand at an early stage. This was indeed a new attitude 
of the authorities toward the problems they were facing, and the change of 
attitude was a very damaging one. In Schultze's presentation an increase Charles  L. Schultze  579 
in conventional inflation norms occurred in that phase, but in this case, 
too, it seems much more convincing to me to assume that after a while the 
markets proved perceptive enough to realize a change in the policy pos- 
ture and that expectations were strongly influenced by this realization. 
So far these comments may give the impression that the entire debate 
is concerned with the difference between two ways of telling essentially 
the same story. But the difference clearly ceases to be that, or merely that, 
once one asks why it is necessary to limit the period analyzed in Schultze's 
paper to specific years if support is to be provided for a moderate but 
inert conventional  inflation "norm" until the  mid-1960s.  The  specific 
years included in Schultze's sample are mainly the years in which, given 
U.S.  monetary institutions and the policy  posture of  the monetary au- 
thorities, the price trend has shown a mild upward trend. Whereas the 
period discussed in the paper includes also  six years of  the  1920s  for 
which the price trend was practically horizontal, these have a small weight 
in the sample as a whole. 
But what if the pre-1965 subperiods are included in which expectations 
were not conditioned by a close approximation to price stability with a 
small margin for upward movement? Could it be argued also that for sub- 
periods with those characteristics, which were not included in the Schultze 
sample, the effect of policy postures on market expectations can alterna- 
tively be described as Schultze's inert norms or rules of thumb? Could it 
be argued also for those subperiods that inert norms change only when 
long-lasting overutilization or underutilization creates a major discrep- 
ancy between the norm and the actual inflation rate (by analogy to the 
1960s)?  I do not see how it could be. 
Schultze states that, in contrast to the experience of the 1960s, the in- 
flations brought about by the two world wars did not break the earlier 
convention of the small and inert inflation norm because these inflationary 
times were regarded as atypical events. I  think he  should have  added 
the Korean inflationary explosion as a third illustration under the same 
heading, but regardless of whether two or three instances are included, 
the essential point is that at those times the authorities succeeded in con- 
vincing the public that in postwar periods they would  not  continue to 
accommodate  inflation,  and  therefore  no  extended  period  of  under- 
utilization was needed to prevent a large inflation norm from becoming 
incorporated into postwar market practices. These events do fall in place 
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pectations but not for the hypothesis of the inert inflation norm. And what 
if the analysis had been made to cover the period from  1879  to  1896, 
which preceded the gold discoveries of the end of the century, and during 
which the gold standard that prevailed became associated with a mildly 
downward-tilted price trend? In that period of gold scarcity the markets 
had good reason to associate such a price trend with the gold standard, 
but they can hardly be assumed to have carried over conventional price- 
trend norms from the preceding era. During that preceding era the Cali- 
fornian and Australian discoveries of the mid-century had made gold un- 
usually abundant for a while. 
And what if the analysis included the years preceding the resumption of 
gold convertibility in 1879? In anticipation of that resumption at $20.67 
an ounce the markets had in those years very good  reason to expect a 
much steeper downward trend of prices than that which continued subse- 
quently, and this steeper downward trend did actually develop and proved 
compatible with a substantial upward trend in output. That clearly hap- 
pened in the anticipation of a credible change in policy posture and can- 
not conceivably be interpreted as the application of  any rule of thumb 
originating in past price experience. 
One may take the position that going back too  far in history makes 
comparisons irrelevant; however, once one goes back to  1900 the argu- 
ment against going back another quarter of a century is not particularly 
convincing. If one decides to focus  on the post-Korean era, Schultze's 
analysis is apt to direct attention to a proposition that lacks the historical 
dimensions of the one I have considered above. This is Schultze's proposi- 
tion that even when anti-inflationary policies were reasonably successful 
during the early part of the post-Korean era-say,  from the end of the 
Korean War to about 1965-the  moderation of nominal demand expan- 
sion during the recessions showed up in little moderation of  the price 
trend (or of the wage and price trend). This proposition receives a good 
deal of attention in Schultze's paper, but to me it seems to stress a numeri- 
cal relation of doubtful importance. 
What matters is that, in the early phase of the post-Korean era when the 
anti-inflationary policy posture was credible, recessions that were asso- 
ciated with just enough demand moderation to play it safe in the direction 
of policy restraint turned slightly and temporarily upward deviating wage 
and price trends back to what the markets believed the authorities were Charles  L. Schultze  581 
determined to achieve. The demand restraint applied at those times ac- 
complished this result with little delay. This is what matters in any attempt 
to judge the record of a credible anti-inflationary policy.  The fact that 
even in the 1950s and the early 1960s demand restraint did not reduce the 
steepness of the wage or price trend by the number of percentage points 
now needed to restore a practically noninflationary economy is not a point 
deserving emphasis. The validity of this statement goes without saying. 
A reduction in the rate of wage and price increase by the number of per- 
centage points now needed could have been achieved by demand i-estraint 
in the 1950s and early 1960s only if the posture of the authorities had 
been interpreted as one  aiming for  a  steeply deflationary price trend. 
There obviously was no reason to interpret the posture as such. 
As may be clear from these comments, I believe that a consistent anti- 
inflationary policy would succeed in breaking what Schultze refers to as 
an increased inflation norm. Such a policy  would  not  accomplish this 
overnight, but it would succeed after an adjustment period whose dura- 
tion depends on the time it takes to establish credibility and to overcome 
the carry-over effect of past cost commitments. A detailed discussion of 
the implications of the inevitability of an adjustment period is not within 
the scope of my comments. But I want to stress the difference between 
recognizing the inevitability of such an adjustment period and what to me 
seems an essential but unconvincing suggestion of  the Schultze paper. 
This is the suggestion that the very steep present inflation allowances in 
cost setting will not give way before a high degree of underutilization has 
lasted long enough to bring about a substantial discrepancy between the 
actual inflation experience and these inflation allowances. 
Robert J. Gordon:  It is fitting that this paper is presented on the fiftieth 
anniversary  of Britain's departure from the gold standard (September 21, 
1931 ), an event that helped plunge the United States into the worst phase 
of its 1929-33  economic  contraction. The puzzling nature of the price 
and wage adjustment process during the years between the two world 
wars, which contributed to the length and severity of the Great Depres- 
sion, is further elucidated in Charles Schultze's ambitious and stimulating 
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who have sailed out of the safe harbor of postwar U.S. data on a voyage 
to explore the relatively uncharted prewar waters.1 
The  leading  questions in  historical investigations  of  U.S.  aggregate 
price behavior pertain to the responsiveness of price changes to changes 
in nominal GNP (or money)  and to the level of utilization or unemploy- 
ment, the role of lagged price changes and the validity of the acceleration- 
ist hypothesis, and the nature and timing of changes in behavior. Findings 
on all three questions matter for current policy debates, since the balance 
between demand responsiveness and inertia in the behavior of aggregate 
price changes determines the output loss associated with a sustained effort 
to decelerate the growth of nominal demand. A judgment on the prob- 
ability of future shifts of parameters in response to policy  changes re- 
quires an evaluation  of  the  only  available evidence  on  the  issue-the 
nature of such parameter shifts in the past. 
In several papers (cited in Schultze's first footnote)  I have been work- 
ing to develop an answer to these questions. I would like to summarize 
my approach and results to provide a context for my subsequent evalua- 
tion of Schultze's paper. In the same notation that Schultze has adopted, 
with uppercase letters denoting logs of levels,  and lowercase letters de- 
noting rates of change, I start by assuming that the rate of change of the 
GNP deflator (Pt)  depends on its own lagged values, on the level  and 
rate of change of the ratio of real GNP to natural (or potential) real GNP 
A 
(Qt =  Qt-  Q*),  and on a vector of supply shifts (Zt): 
(1)  pt  =  a(L)pt-, +  boQt  +  b,AQt +  b2zt  +  et, 
where a(L)  is a polynomial in the lag operator and et is an error term. 
Defining adjusted nominal GNP growth as the excess of the growth rate of 
nominal GNP over that of natural real GNP  (A  =  Yt-  q*), the use of 
an identity (Qt  Q1t-  +  Yt -  Pt)  allows the derivation of a relation be- 
1. In addition to  Schultze's footnote citations to  work by Cagan, Sachs, and 
me, additional recent contributions  include the papers and comments contained in 
Karl  Brunner,  ed.,  The  Great  Depression  Revisited  (Boston:  Martinus  Nijhoff, 
1981); R. A. Gordon, "Wages,  Prices, and Unemployment, 1900-1970," Industrial 
Relations, vol. 14 (October 1975), pp. 273-301; Allan Meltzer, "Anticipated  Infla- 
tion  and Unanticipated  Price  Change,"  Journal  of  Montey, Credit  and Banking,  vol. 
8  (May 1978),  pp. 182-205;  and Christopher  A.  Sims, "Comparison  of Interwar 
and Postwar Business Cycles: Monetarism  Reconsidered,"  American Economic Re- 
view,  vol.  70  (May  1980,  Papers  and  Proceedings,  1979),  pp.  250-57. Charles  L. Schultze  583 
tween price change, adjusted nominal GNP change, and the lagged level 
of the output ratio: 
I  A  A 
(2)  pt  =  I +  bo +  bi [a(L)pt,i +  (bo +  bi)yt +  boQt-l +  b2zt +  et]. 
In this framework the  significance of  the  estimated coefficient on  the 
lagged output ratio indicates the presence  of  an output "level  effect," 
while the difference between the coefficient on  adjusted nominal GNP 
growth and the lagged output ratio indicates the relative size of the "rate- 
of-change effect." If the coefficients on lagged price change and on ad- 
justed nominal GNP  change sum to unity, then the accelerationist hy- 
pothesis is validated in the sense that a positive output ratio (Qt-1  >  0) 
or an adverse supply shift (Zt  >  0)  causes an acceleration of the inflation 
rate relative to its past value.2 
Questions  may  be  raised  about  the  appearance  of  nominal  GNP 
change in equation 2 above, an equation explaining price change. Nomi- 
nal GNP change is indeed an endogenous variable, although no more so 
than the current unemployment rate that has traditionally been used in 
Phillips curve studies. The advantage of using equation 2 for estimation 
instead of equation 1 becomes clear when considering a period like 1915- 
22, when prices responded promptly and completely to changes in nomi- 
nal GNP, with little residual effect on real GNP. In a world of fast price 
responsiveness to  serially correlated nominal  GNP  movements,  an in- 
vestigator who forces all of the price adjustment to be explained by real 
variables and lagged price change, as in 1, will find the results plagued by 
positive serial correlation and an upward bias in the coefficient on lagged 
price change. Another alternative to 2, which involves replacing nominal 
GNP change with the change in a monetary aggregate, has the quite dif- 
ferent disadvantage that the resulting coefficient on money will mix aggre- 
gate demand and aggregate supply effects; that is, it reflects the combined 
influence of the response of  velocity  to  monetary changes and the re- 
sponse of  prices to  nominal GNP  changes. Finally,  the  most  obvious 
source of bias in the coefficient on nominal GNP change, stemming from 
2. Schultze's  equation la  is identical to my equation 2, with the omission of the 
lagged output ratio (Qti,),  if one associates  his PA with my b2zt, and his PN with my 
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the simultaneous increase in prices and nominal GNP that would occur 
when supply shocks are accompanied by an accommodating monetary 
policy, can be mitigated by careful attention to the specification of the 
supply shift variables (Zt). 
The empirical results in table 1 below provide four alternative estimates 
of equation 2 for the eighty-eight years extending between 1892 and 1980. 
The format of table 1 represents my first comment on Schultze's paper, 
since  my  methodology  that estimates  a  single  equation  characterizing 
the entire sample period differs radically from Schultze's methodology 
that divides history into segments-peacetime,  wartime, Great Depres- 
sion, and post-1966-with  no tests of statistical significance provided to 
support the hypothesis of radical shifts in structure between segments. 
Most other previous investigations of historical data have also  divided 
the sample period, most typically by omitting entirely the years of  the 
Great Depression  and World War II.  My  approach does  not  rule out 
changes in structure but rather attempts to quantify parameter shifts in 
a way that provides a measure of the statistical significance of each shift. 
The results in table  1 are arranged from worst-fitting on  the left  to 
best-fitting on the right. The first column displays a naive Phillips curve, 
in which price change is allowed to depend only on a constant and on the 
lagged values  of  the output ratio and of  the dependent  variable. The 
second column adds nominal GNP change, with the implied result that 
almost half of nominal GNP change is absorbed by price change in the 
current year. In both of  these  columns the level  effect, the traditional 
Phillips  curve  hypothesis  that  price  change  depends  on  the  level  of 
utilization, is insignificant. 
The third column adds the supply shift variables, of  which five are 
dummy variables to capture the impact of five different episodes of gov- 
ernment intervention in the  price-setting process,  and the  sixth is  the 
annual change in the relative price of food and energy. The dummy vari- 
ables are not of the usual 0,1  form. My own previous research on the 
Nixon controls and the National Recovery Act finds that both programs 
not only shifted the price level during their official period of impact but 
caused a shift in the opposite direction after their termination. All dummy 
variables in table 1 are defined to sum to 1.0 during the period of a pro- 
gram's impact, and to  -  1.0 during the period after its termination, thus 
constraining the impact and rebound effects to  have  exactly  the  same 
absolute value. The resulting coefficients on the dummy variables indicate 
the cumulative displacement of the price level during the period of the Charles L. Schultze  585 
Table 1. Equations  Explaining  the Annual  Percentage  Change  in the GNP Deflator, 
1892-1980a 
Naive  Supply 
Independent  variable,  constant,  Phillips  shifts  Parameter 
and summary  statistic  curve  added  added  shifts 
Adjusted  nominal  GNP (y,) 
Entire  period  ...  0.44  0.46  0.33 
Extra  effect, 1915-22  ...  ...  ...  0.54 
Extra  effect, 1942-49  ...  ...  ...  0.19 
Lagged  adjusted  nominal GNP (Y6t-)  ...  ...  ...  0.  lOb 
Lagged  real GNP ratio  (Qt_l) 
Entire  period  0.Olc  0.07c  0.06b  0.18 
Extra  effect, 1929-41  ...  ...  ...  -0.17 
Lagged  price  change  (ft_1)d 
Entire  period  0.50  0.20b  0.27  0.05c 
Extra  effect, 1950-80  ...  ...  ...  0.41 
Supply  shiftse 
World  War I controls, 1915-22  ...  ...  -5.46  -8.82 
National Recovery  Act, 1933-36  ...  ...  8.23  7.21 
World  War II controls, 1943-47  ...  ...  -17.80  -19.00 
Korean War  controls, 1950-52  ...  ...  -0.  25C  -2.  54b 
Nixon controls, 1972-75  ...  ...  -5.00  -4.76 
Relative  price of food and energy, 1947-80f  ...  ...  1.03  0. 54g 
Constant  term  1.46  1.29  0.97  0.61b 
Summary  statistic 
R2  0.25  0.64  0.79  0.92 
Standard  error  of estimate  4.71  3.29  2.55  1.63 
Source:  A  data  appendix  is  available  on  request  from  the  author. 
a.  All  coefficients  are  statistically  significant  at  the  1  percent  level  unless  otherwise  indicated.  For  1890- 
1954  the  level  of  natural  real  GNP,  Q*,  used  to  create  the  ye  and  Qt  variables  is  computed  by  the  method 
described  in  Robert  J.  Gordon,  Macroeconomics,  2d  ed.  (Little,  Brown  and  Co.,  1981),  appendix  C,  pp. 
22-23.  For  1954-80  the  level  of  Q * is  taken  from  Robert  J.  Gordon,  "Inflation,  Flexible  Exchange  Rates, 
and  the  Natural  Rate  of  Unemployment,"  Working  Paper  708  (National  Bureau  of  Economic  Research, 
July  1981),  appendix  B. 
b.  Significant  at  the  5  percent  level. 
c.  Not  significant. 
d.  In  equations  containing  the  supply-shift  variables,  the  lagged  price  change  is  computed  by  netting 
out  the influence  of  the  special  factors.  Thus  if  Dit  is  the  level  of  dummy  variable  i and  di is its  coefficient, 
then  net lagged  price  change  is calculated  as 
pi'  = pt-I  -  ZdiDi,_1-  dopFl, 
where  do is  the  coefficient  on  the  relative  food-energy  price  variable,  ptFE. 
e.  All  dummy  variables  are  defined  to  sum  to  unity  during  the  period  when  a  program  of  government 
intervention  is  in  effect  and  to  -  1  after  its  termination.  The  National  Recovery  Act,  World  War  II,  and 
Nixon  dummy  variables  are  defined  exactly  as  in  Gordon,  "A  Consistent  Characterization  of  a  Near- 
Century  of  Price  Behavior,"  American  Econoinic  Review,  vol. 70 (May  1980,  Papers  anid Proceedinigs,  1979), 
p.  246,  note  10. The  World  War  I and  Korean  dummy  variables  are  new.  The  variables  are  as  follows. 
National 
World  War  I  Recovery  Act  World  War  II  Korean  War  Nixon  controls 
1918  1.0  1933  0.4  1943  0.5  1950  -0.5  1972  0.5 
1919  -0.5  1934  0.6  1944  0.4  1951  -0.5  1973  0.5 
1920  -0.5  1935  -0.4  1945  0.1  1952  1.0  1974  -0.3 
1936  -0.6  1946  -0.6  1975  -0.7 
1947  -0.4 
f.  The  variable  used  to  represent  changes  in  the  relative  price  of  food  and  energy  is  the  difference  be- 
tween  the annual  rates  of  change  of  the  deflators  for,  respectively,  personal  consumption  expenditure  and 
personal  consumption  expenditure  net  of  expenditure  on  food  and  energy.  This  variable  is  available 
only  for  1947-80  and  is set  equal  to  zero  before  1947. 
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program's impact.3 An  advantage of  this  method  is  that,  because  all 
dummy variables sum to zero, collectively they do not explain any  of the 
elevenfold increase in the GNP deflator that occurred between 1892 and 
1980. 
The coefficients on the supply shift variables in the third column are 
significant (except  for the Korean War dummy)  and of plausible mag- 
nitudes. In light of the tightness of the World War II price controls and 
the 50 percent rate of inflation that occurred in the third quarter of 1946 
after their termination, the estimated cumulative impact of -18  percent 
seems conservative. The impact of World War I controls was less than 
half as large, as was the National  Recovery Act  in the opposite direc- 
tion.4 The  impact  of  the  Nixon  controls  was  smaller  still,  but  still 
significant. 
In addition to its interesting and novel findings regarding the behavior 
of wage rates, the consumer price index and the wholesale price index, 
on which I will not comment directly, Schultze's paper makes four main 
points about the behavior of the implicit GNP  deflator. First, with the 
exception of a greater degree of flexibility in wartime, the flexibility co- 
efficient, Ap/Ay',  remained remarkably steady for  the private nonfarm 
sector at 15 to 20 percent throughout the period between 1900 and 1966. 
Second, the level effect of the output ratio is purely a postwar phenome- 
non. Third, coefficients on lagged price change do  not support the ac- 
celerationist hypothesis  before  1967.  Finally,  the  upsurge of  inflation 
after 1966 cannot be described as a continuous response to quantifiable 
variables, and instead must be discussed in the language of discrete "norm 
shifts." 
Because  most of  these  results involve  presumed shifts in parameter 
values over time, I have investigated whether there were significant shifts 
(At 
A 
in the coefficients on the four economic variables (Y, Yt-i, Qt-1, and Pt-1) 
for the following subperiods-1892-1903,  1904-14,  1915-22,  1929-41, 
1942-49,  1950-53,  1954-66,  and 1967-80.  I also tested for a shift in the 
constant term for 1967-80.  Of the thirty-three possible parameter shifts 
3. The dummy variables are defined in note e to table 1. The odd timing of the 
Korean War variable reflects my verdict that the Korean War controls did no more 
than capture  the unwinding  of the speculative commodity boom of 1950-51. 
4.  For a discussion of World War I controls see F. W. Taussig, "Price-Fixing 
as Seen by a Price-Fixer,"  Quarterly  Journal  of Economics, vol. 33 (February 1919), 
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thus tested, only  four were significant, and these  are displayed in  the 
fourth column.5 
The results partially support and partially contradict those of Schultze. 
First, our shared verdict that the flexibility coefficient, Ap/A>  , was stable 
remains intact (with a large upward parameter shift during the World 
War I period and a smaller upward shift during World War II).  My 
33 percent estimate of the full-period effect for total GNP is larger than 
the 22 percent one obtains from averaging his prewar and postwar effects 
for total GNP. Supporting Schultze's verdict that level effects were absent 
in the Great Depression and the entire impact of demand worked through 
rate-of-change effects, the "extra effect, 1929-41"  entry, row 8 of table 1, 
shows that the coefficient on the level effect was completely canceled out 
during 1929-41.  But the form of this result provides the first refutation 
of Schultze's results, for he argues that the level effect is purely a postwar 
phenomenon, whereas my statistical search supports the verdict that the 
level effect was about the same in  1892-1929  as after World War II. 
There is no explicit contradiction here because Schultze never actually 
estimates a prewar equation that excludes 1929-41.  Next, the coefficient 
on  row  11,  "extra effect,  1950-80,"  supports a positive  inertia effect 
beginning in 1950. 
Taken together, the results in the fourth column of table 1 contradict 
two of Schultze's main points. The first point is that, far from denying the 
accelerationist hypothesis  for  1950-66,  the  coefficients indicate  a  re- 
sponse of price change to a permanent increase of nominal GNP growth 
for the entire 1950-80  period of almost unity.6 (The relevant sum of co- 
efficients  adds that in the "entire  period" row for current adjusted nominal 
GNP growth, that for "lagged adjusted nominal GNP," and the two co- 
efficients for lagged price change-that  is, 0.33  +  0.10  +  0.05  +  0.41  = 
0.89.)  My search pins down the date of the shift in the role of price inertia 
at 1950, not 1942,  1954, or 1967. This provides support for the hypoth- 
esis that the advent of the three-year overlapping staggered U.S.  wage 
5. The fourth column also includes a significant impact of the lagged value of 
nominal  GNP change. 
6. Although a sum of coefficients of unity is consistent with the accelerationist 
hypothesis,  a sum of coefficients  below unity does not necessarily conflict with that 
hypothesis,  an important  point originally made in Thomas J. Sargent, "A Note on 
the  Accelerationist  Controversy,"  Joutrnal of  Money,  Credit  and  Banking,  vol.  3 
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contract in 1948 explains the greater degree of wage and price inertia in 
the postwar United States than in other countries. 
Schultze's second point, that the 1967-80  period cannot be explained 
without invoking the concept of the norm shift, raises a methodological 
issue. Schultze's methodological hypothesis, that it is impossible to pro- 
vide a convincing econometric explanation of post-1 966 price changes, is 
implicit but never proved, since no failed equations are provided. I have 
tried to find statistically significant shifts for the 1967-80  subperiod in the 
equation reported in the fourth column of table 1. I have tested for shifts 
in every variable, including further lags of the dependent variable (Pt-2, 
. . . , Pt-5) and have found nothing. The test that seems closest to what 
Schultze has in mind, a shift in the constant term for 1967-80,  yields a 
coefficient of 0.8 with a t-ratio of 0.9. Just as the response of the inflation 
rate to the acceleration of money and nominal GNP growth between 1966 
and 1970 can be adequately captured by conventional time-series econo- 
metric techniques, so the hypothetical adjustment of inflation to a mone- 
tary deceleration can be  captured by the same methods. The  amazing 
implication of my own research, as summarized in table  1, is that the 
structure of price behavior has changed so little, not so much, and that 
there is thus scant historical evidence to support the vague claims of the 
Lucas critique of econometric policy evaluation. I believe that the good 
news thus far in 1981 on wage and price behavior is a prelude to more of 
the same, and that what went up will come down, in much the same way 
and at more or less the same pace.7 
Charles Schultze: The contrast between my findings and those of Robert 
Gordon are starker than Gordon himself suggests. Because the coefficient 
on the aggregate demand variable in his equations is relatively stable, he 
interprets his equations as implying, like my own analysis, an unchanged 
basic  structure of price behavior between prewar and postwar years, with 
somewhat greater inertia in the latter period due to the introduction of 
three-year staggered wage contracts. But one must take all parts of the 
equation into account to address this question, particularly the implicit 
7.  An explicit factor that may have increased the responsiveness of  prices to 
monetary  policy, the advent of flexible exchange rates, is not incorporated  in table 1 
but is treated in detail in Gordon, "Inflation, Flexible Exchange Rates, and the 
Natural Rate of Unemployment," Working Paper 708  (National Bureau of  Eco- 
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and explicit coefficients on current and lagged price change. When one 
does this, Gordon's equations for the postwar period imply an accelera- 
tionist economy in which output is ultimately neutral to changes in nomi- 
nal demand and in which four-fifths of  the long-run price  adjustment 
takes place within three years. By contrast, his prewar results describe an 
economy that was far from being accelerationist or money-neutral. 
Gordon's coefficient on aggregate demand is higher than mine for two 
reasons: first, Gordon uses the total GNP deflator rather than my less- 
responsive private nonfarm deflator. Second, I subtract the norm rate of 
inflation from both the change in the deflator and the change in nominal 
GNP, which necessarily leads to a lower coefficient. 
Finally, although Gordon offers strictures against segmentation of the 
analysis into various periods, his own equations show the need for some 
kind of segmentation. Gordon has four periods with different behavioral 
characteristics, which he captures by his "extra effects" coefficients. The 
major difference between us is that he does not break the postwar period 
into two parts, divided after the mid-1960s. 
I  disagree with William Fellner's  argument that the  stability of  my 
flexibility coefficient could be predicted on rational expectations grounds 
because the experience with monetary policy  or monetary growth was 
roughly similar during the peacetime cycles I analyzed. It was not. The 
standard deviations of  annual changes in prices around norm inflation 
rates and the money supply (M2)  around its trend rates of growth were 
one and a half to two times as large in the prewar peacetime cycles as 
in the post-Korean  War period  (through 1966).  According to rational 
expectations theory, this should have led to a substantially changed ex- 
pectational framework in the latter period and hence to a much different 
observed response of inflation to changes in aggregate demand. 
General Discussion 
Joseph Pechman asked Charles Schultze and the two formal discus- 
sants to describe the likely duration and cost of a macroeconomic policy 
that would lead to price stability. Based on his own work, Robert Gordon 
said that, starting from an initial inflation rate of  10 percent, inflation 
could be reduced to 5 percent over a five-year period if the monetary 
authorities were willing to slow the growth of nominal GNP by 1 percent 590  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
a year. The real cost of such a program would be a gap between actual 
and potential GNP of 4 percent by the fifth year, and a cumulative loss 
of 25 to 30 percent of one year's real GNP over the decade that would 
elapse before output and unemployment returned to normal. Schultze had 
no quantitative evidence about the necessary duration of a stabilization 
program because his model does not yield predictions about the future of 
inflation norms. However, he felt that a program depending on aggregate 
demand reductions would take longer to succeed than Gordon's quantita- 
tive results suggested. William Fellner stated that estimates based on his- 
torical  experience  during periods  of  an  accommodative  basic  policy 
posture will overstate the costs of disinflation. He believed stability could 
be attained during the course of a single business cycle, depending on the 
length of time it takes for authorities to establish the credibility of their 
program and also depending on the carry-over effects of presently existing 
long-term contracts. Although the required recession did not necessarily 
have to be severe, the recovery would at least have to be slow. 
Benjamin Friedman observed that any attempt to make disinflation a 
credible policy regardless of its cost would require too much time to be 
accomplished by a single Congress or administration. For the policy to be 
credible, the public would have to believe the administration would win 
reelection despite the costs its policy would impose on the voters. Ed- 
mund Phelps  was  skeptical  that  the  stabilization  policy  described by 
Gordon would  actually be pursued. He  pointed  out  that although the 
authorities may control some version of the money supply, M, they hardly 
control M x  V, money multiplied by its velocity, or nominal GNP. Even 
assuming M  x  V could be reduced in line with Gordon's nominal GNP 
targets, the authorities might not want to accept its possible side effects 
such as bank failures. 
In the same vein, Donald Hester questioned whether the government 
should focus its authority on establishing credibility for its price stabiliza- 
tion program as Fellner and others had urged. Hester pointed out that 
there are many areas in which the credibility of government is important, 
such as defense policy, foreign relations, and guarantees against the col- 
lapse  of  financial institutions.  If  these  conflict  with  economic  policy, 
attempts to establish credibility about price expectations should not take 
precedence over them. 
A spirited discussion centered around Schultze's definition and use of Charles L. Schultze  591 
inflation norms. Alan Blinder believed that the norm approach implied 
inflationary expectations moved  in a steplike manner, which he found 
implausible. He reasoned that when one  aggregates over the beliefs  of 
many firms and consumers, even if  those  individual beliefs  move  dis- 
continuously, the sum of expectations will move in a smooth way. Charles 
Holt agreed that discontinuous jumps are implausible, but he sympathized 
with Schultze's aim of modeling expectations as ordinarily stable even 
when observed inflation is fluctuating. He  suggested that expectations 
might be nonlinear, rising rapidly once inflation reaches a threshold value. 
William Nordhaus objected that he did not understand the theory behind 
threshold effects  and  agreed with  Blinder  that  expectations  ought  to 
change continuously. He also objected to Robert Gordon's excessive use 
of dummy variables to deal with developments that did not fit the basic 
model. Schultze responded to the critics of his view by arguing that there 
is more going on in the formation of inflationary expectations than can be 
accounted for by simple adaptive expectations. But he agreed that he does 
not have a satisfactory way to predict when the norm will change. 
Lawrence  Summers pointed  out  that  the  movements  in  long-term 
interest rates over the late  1960s  and 1970s provide some indirect sup- 
port for discontinuously changing inflation norms. Bond rates rose to a 
new plateau at the end of the 1960s, from which they varied only a little 
despite large variations in actual inflation, and then moved to a new pla- 
teau again at the end of  1970s. Martin Baily pointed out that the norm 
view has an optimistic as well as a pessimistic policy interpretation. The 
current administration could  take hope  from Schultze's view  that the 
norm could be  discontinuously  reduced, although his  analysis did not 
describe what effect particular policies would have on it. Norm changes 
have  typically  followed  actual  inflation developments,  although  they 
might also be responsive to new policy regimes. Robin Marris observed 
that evidence of something like a norm shift in the late  1960s was ap- 
parent in inflation relations for most industrial countries. In estimates of 
conventional Phillips  curve relations,  these  show  up  either as  discon- 
tinuous shifts in the constant terms or in enlarged coefficients on lagged 
inflation. 
Jeffrey  Sachs observed that Schultze's own results for wages and whole- 
sale prices show they are now less responsive to demand fluctuations than 
they were earlier. Therefore he questioned Schultze's overall conclusion 592  Brookings Papers on Economic  Activity, 2:1981 
that the cyclical responsiveness of inflation has changed little over long 
periods and different policy regimes. Schultze responded that, first, the 
most relevant results are those for final prices, so the wage and wholesale 
price results are less important; and second, wages never were very flex- 
ible so the decline in the postwar period represents little change. Sachs 
noted that whether the change in the flexibility coefficient for wages is 
important depends on what question is asked. When a small flexibility 
coefficient on wages becomes even smaller, it means that the large output 
cost of slowing wage inflation has become even larger. 